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THE  
FIRST PART OF  
THE DISQVISITION  
OF TRVTH, CON-  
CERNING POLITI-  
CAL AFFAIRES.


HANDLED  
In two feuerall Sections.

The first whereof (by way of  
*certaine questions probleme-wise*  
propounded and answered) con-  
sisteth of foureteene Chapters.

*Written by Henry Wright.*




LONDON,  
Printed by NICHOLAS OKES.  
1616.



LONDON:  
Printed by Nicholas Okey  
1686.






TO THE RIGHT  
HONOVABLE, SIR  
JOHN FOLLES, Knight,  
Lord Maior of the Citie of  
LONDON.

AND

To the Right Worshipfull the  
*rest of the Aldermen his*  
Brethren, &c.

{ Right Honourable  
&  
{ Right Worshipfull,

 Although I very well know,  
that no man (almost) in  
handling any politique dis-  
course, could ever satisfie the expecta-  
tion of such as were skilfull, or un-  
skil-

## The Epistle Dedicatorie.

skilfull in the exercising, acting, and managing of such affaires: the one, because they could not vnderstand: the other, for that they were (most what) too curious, neuer regarding any thing more, then the vse thereof for seruing the time present: yet for the great respect I haue euer borne to the Honourable Citie of London (wherein I haue had the most part of my liuing and abiding,) and (in particular) to your Honour, and Worships the worthy gouernours ther of (whom I know to be iudicious, yet free from curiosity) I haue aduentured to propound to the world my priuate conceipts touching that subiect. May it please your Honour and Worships therefore (till better grow) to accept these first fruits of my barren-braine, and by your favourable



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## The Epistle Dedicatorie.

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able approving of them, to protect & defend them against the snarlings of blacke-mouth'd Momists, who are ever more ready to carpe at other mens writings, then to amend them, or to suffer any of their owne once to view the light. The matter I borrowed (as you may perceiue) out of the best and most approved Authours and Historiographers: the forme, frame and disposition of the worke is mine owne, which (such as it is) together with my best seruices; I commend to your Honour and Worships, and your selues to the grace of God, and so rest,


By your Honour, and Worships

euermore ready to be commanded,

Henry Wright.







THE SVMMARY  
AND HEADS OF THE  
Chapters contained in this first  
*part of the Disquisition of Truth,*  
*concerning Politicall*  
*affaires.*

SECT. I. CHAP. I.



*F Religion, and the force thereof:  
whereupon and how it commeth to  
passe, that there be such and so many  
diuersities and differences of opini-  
ons concerning the same.*

SECT. I. CHAP. 2.

*Of the best forme of a Common-wealth.*

SECT. I. CHAP. 3.

*Of the Prince, Court, Courtiers, &c.*

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SECT.

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## SECT. I. CHAP. 9.

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## SECT. I. CHAP. IO.

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the*



# The Contents.

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## SECT. I. CHAP. II.

*Of Studies, dispositions, &c. and whence the diuersity thereof may proceed. Of learning, &c. how necessary for a Prince. Of intelligence, and the use and benefit thereof.*

## SECT. I. CHAP. 12.

*Of peace, and the conditions thereof. Of the state and affaires of Princes. Of Embassages, Embassadors, &c.*

## SECT. I. CHAP. 13.

*Of discord and faction, whereof they take their beginnings, and of the nourishing, or not nourishing of them in a common-wealth.*

## SECT. I. CHAP. 14.

*Of Sedition, mutinie, and defection of the greatest part of the people in a State, and of standing Neutrall, or part-taking.*







The chiefe Authors whom I haue  
followed in compiling of this  
worke, *Alphabetically*  
*set downe.*

A

**A**ugustine.  
Aristotle.  
Amianus.

Attius.  
Aulus Politicus.  
Aristophanes.

B

The Bible.  
Petrus Bembus.

C

Quintus Curtius.  
Philippus Cominaeus.

B 3

Capitolinus

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Capitolinus.

Marcus Tullius Cicero.

Cladianus.

Philippus Camerarius.

D

Dant an Italian Poet.

Dio Cassius.

Diodorus Siculus.

Demosthenes.

E

Euripides.

F

Valerius Flaccus.

G

Franciscus Guicardinus.

Aulus Gellius.

H

Horatius.

Herodotus.

I

Iuuenall.

Iosephus.

Lactantius



L

Lactantius.

Lucretius.

Lucanus.

Titus Liuius.

M

Machiavell.

Valerius Maximus.

O

Ouidius.

P

Plato.

Plutarchus.

Phauorinus, Philoso-  
phus.

Polybius.

Plautus.

Plinius,

Pindarus.

Pacuvius.

Q

Quintilianus.

Henricus

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R

Henricus Ranzovius.

S

Salustius.

Stobæus,

Seneca,

Suetonius,

T

Tholozanus,

Thucidides,

Cornelius Tacitus,

V

Velleius,

Vegetius,

X

Xenophon,

Z

Zimera Problem.





THE FIRST  
PART OF THE DIS-  
QUISITION OF TRUTH,  
Concerning Politicall Affaires.

SECT. I. CAP. I.

Of Religion, and the force thereof:  
wbereupon, and how it commeth  
to passe, that there be such, and so  
many, diuersities, and differences,  
of Opinions, concerning the same.

- I. *It may bee demanded wherefore the wisest<sup>a</sup> Law-  
giuers did euer conclusionally determine, that the  
care of Religion, and all holy things should be-  
long vnto the Prince?*

<sup>a</sup> Licurgus. So-  
lon. Epaminon-  
das, Numa, Xe-  
nophon.



As it because they thought it fit,  
that that which was<sup>b</sup> best, and most  
worthy to bee had in honour,  
should bee honoured of the best,  
and him who bare the chiefest rule  
in the Monarchy, or State? Or was

<sup>b</sup> Diogenes apud  
Stobaeum.

• *Xenophon*  
*Pædia Cyri. l. 8.*

• *Arist. Rhet.*  
*ad Alex.*

• *Lactantius*  
*de ira Cap. 12.*

it rather, because they wisely considered, that<sup>c</sup> if their Subjects feared God, they would bee the more loath to do any thing which might redound to the hurt of one another, or attempt any thing against the Prince? Or was it not for these causes alone, but rather likewise, <sup>d</sup> for the augmenting and enlarging of their Empire and Dominions, as though the Diuine Powers were more prone, propitious, and fauourable, towards those that serue them, then vnto any others? Or to conclude, was it for the generall good of a Common-wealth, as a certaine<sup>e</sup> Diuine plainly protested, who held that Religion, and the Feare of God, were the surest bands for conseruing of Humane Society?

2 *It may further bee demanded, how farre a Prince ought to take care of matters concerning Religion?*

**O**Vght hee (as some do thinke) to take care for the examination of the truth or falshood of that Religion which hee professeth, and in all Ecclesiasticall matters to take vpon him to bee chiefe Iudge and Determiner of them, according to his owne municipall Lawes? Or ought hee rather (as others imagine) to bee a defender onely of that Religion which formerly hath beene receiued, or afterwards is propounded or obtruded vnto him?

<sup>f</sup> The opinion of all Princes and States not subiect to the Pope.

<sup>g</sup> The opinion of the Church of Rome and her adherents.

<sup>f</sup> This latter may be thought an vniust limitation, that any Prince, or State, should bee so curbed: and as touching the former, <sup>g</sup> others thinke that a Prince hath no free power, or authority, to constitute or determine



determine Ecclesiasticall businesse, but that by bare permission onely, hee may haue a meere inspection into them: Which monstrous Opinion, in a Treatise (almost ready to come forth) I haue refuted: Euidently prouing that the Church, being a part of the State, it cannot bee without apparant danger to the same, to admit of forraigne Iurisdiction in managing matters Ecclesiasticall, but that such affaires ought alwaies to bee ordered by those who beare the Soueraignty, or some other, by their appointment, within the same State.

3 *It may bee further demanded, wherefore the<sup>h</sup> Romanes alwaies confessed and acknowledged that they were more obliged and indebted to Numa then to Romulus.* <sup>h</sup> Liu. lib. 7.  
<sup>h</sup> hist. Rom.

**T**His question (*Right Honourable*) out of the Romanes owne History is thus resolved: Affirming that *Romulus* (though founder of their City) left little or nothing vnto them, but their names to be called Romanes: But *Numa* (being the chiefe bringer in of Religion) perpetuated the same, and seemed to giue vnto them their very essence and being, and (as it were) to cause the prosperous successe of their State. For *Romulus* (saith the History) brought in the forme of a Common wealth, which was likely not to be durable, but might end with himselfe: But his Successor *Numa*, vpon the bringing in the continuall practise and exercise of Religion, did in such wise forme and frame the

Common-wealth, that though himselfe should shortly die, yet there was left an euident meane and way to make it durable for many ages.

4 *To the same purpose it may be demanded, wherefore the<sup>i</sup> Romanes did make more account of Religion then all other Nations?*

<sup>1</sup> Liu. lib. 10.  
Hist. Rom.

**V**V As it because they plainely saw, that the settling Religion in the State, was the firme<sup>st</sup> prop they could rely vpon, for the vpholding, conseruing, and perpetuating of their Common-wealth, and that it would serue most fitly for the bringing in of Military Discipline, and Armes, to which they were most addicted, and without which they iudged their State could not stand? Or was it rather, for that they vnder this pretence (as those who knew how to make vse of Religion) did practise it more fortunately, and with better successe then others, to retaine and keepe those which were good in their allegiance and obedience, and to curbe and restraine those who were ill disposed from committing euill, or persisting and continuing in their lewd courses: as likewise to<sup>k</sup> pacifie the seditious, reconcile such Subiects as were iustly offended and grieued, with the Rulers and the gouernment, <sup>m</sup> retaine their Military Discipline, and keep their Souldiers in good order, <sup>n</sup> get credite and authority to their Commanders: enterprise warres, and to bring them to a happy end?

<sup>k</sup> Liu. lib. 3.  
circa legem Te-  
rentillam.

<sup>1</sup> Liu. lib. 3. circa  
creationem tri-  
bulorum plebis  
consulari digni-  
tate.

<sup>m</sup> Liu. lib. 5.

<sup>n</sup> Liu. lib. 10.



- 5 *Againe, it may bee demanded to the same purpose, wherefore the Romanes, euen in their greatest streights and difficulties did rather vse the pretext and colour of religion, to expedite and helpe themselves, then any other meanes whatsoeuer.*

**W**As it because ° they were perswaded that the Common-people did rather iudge by the shadowes then the substances of things? Or was it not for that cause alone, but rather for that they found by experience, that men are more thoroughly moued, and thinke themselves faster tyed vpon an oath taken (which hath his dependancie vpon Religion) then by any Lawes or Statutes whatsoeuer?

° Francisc.  
Guicciardin.

P. Lin. lib. 3.

- 6 *It may further bee demanded wherefore in former times men (generally) were more religious then they are in these dayes?*

**W**As it because that in those elder times there was not that contempt of Religion, and neglect of God & his seruice, as is now in these moderne dayes? Or was it rather, because in those more happy times, it was held altogether vnlawfull for any man to make what construction he list of an oath when hee had taken it, and thereout to frame rules of liuing to himselfe, according to his owne liking; but to fashion his life and manners rather to

such lawes as were giuen, and imposed vpon him to obserue?

7 *It may finally be demanded, wherefore (seeing there is but one truth) there are at this day so many and sundry opinions about Religion, euen among Christians themselves.*

**I**Sit because the Clergie themselves in diuers poynts disagree, being distracted into factions, and writing and disputing one against another; which the rude and ignorant multitude once seeing, do thereby take vpon them to dispute of *Diuinitie*, to establish their fond and foolish opinions in matters of *Religion*, which in no wise belonged vnto them to meddle withall? Or may it bee, for that sometime yong Schollers, either in yeares, learning or discretion taking vpon them to preach, teach, or write, doe propound false or vnsound *Doctrine* to the people: whose corrupt opinions once set a-broach (as though it were a shame for them to change them vpon more mature deliberation into better) do continually bestirre themselves, and employ their wits, rather to confirme, then amend their errors? Or is this the reason rather, for that the followers of any Sect whatsoever, study to tread in their first Teachers steps, and obserue such courses and customes as formerly haue bene prescribed vnto them?



SECT. I. CHAP. II.

Of the best forme of a Commonwealth.

I It may bee demanded, wherefore according to many mens opinions, the Monarchy, or sole rule of one, ought to be preferred before other formes of gouernment?



Is it because that<sup>a</sup> Monarchy is the most ancient kinde of gouernment, seeing that the name of Monarchy and Empire was first in the world? Or is it because this kinde of gouernment best agreeth to<sup>b</sup> nature, as is to be seene by all, or the

<sup>a</sup> Cic. de legibus lib. 3. Iustinus Historicus lib. 1. in initio.

<sup>b</sup> Salust in Epistolis.

most of all other creatures, in whom this image and shadow of one to rule ouer the rest may plainly appeare? Or is it because it is most agreeable to<sup>c</sup> reason, that the body of an Empire being but one, should likewise be swayed by the discretion of one sole Ruler? Or is this rather the reason, because that neither in a<sup>d</sup> popular estate, where many gouerne, nor in an Aristocracie, where a few sway the scepter, there can be possible any long concord and agreement among them? Or is it because that both in<sup>e</sup> Democracies and Aristocracies it hath bin euer obserued, that

<sup>c</sup> Tacit. 1. Annal

<sup>d</sup> Tacit. 4. Annal

<sup>e</sup> Tacit. 1. Annal Lib. 5.

This was ordinary in the *Romane*-state: so is it at this day in the *Venetian* state, as *Petr. Bembus* reporteth in his history of that state.

<sup>f</sup> *Zimara in Problem.*

<sup>z</sup> *Idem ibidem.*

<sup>h</sup> The opinion of *Solon de Re-pub. Attica* vpon which very ground, hee framed the *Democracie* of the *Athenian Commonwealth*.

that in all difficult busineses they were glad to abandon the former kinde of gouernment, and conferre the absolute power, strength and authoritie vpon one onely, who should dispose of all things according to his owne good liking? Or may this bee the reason, for that *Monarchie* doth approach, come neere, and euen resemble the Maiestie and similitude of the diuine *Regencie*? or is it for that in a *Monarchie* the order of lawes, the execution of iustice, & all seemly proportion in doing any thing, is more easily kept and obserued, then in *Democracie*, or *Aristocracie*? Or may this likewise be the reason, for that in case the gouernment swaied by one, should grow into <sup>f</sup> tyranny, it were much better to endure the yoke of one Tyrant, then of many? Or finally, may this be the reason, that whereas the gouernement of the State is conferred vpon many, <sup>g</sup> few, or none of them respect the common good, but their owne profite? Whereupon it commeth to passe, that one of them falling out with another, the Commonwealth is in danger of ship-wracke, it being much more easie for one then for many to bee disposed to goodnesse.

2 In the next place it may be demanded, wherefore (according to other mens opinions) the *Democracie*, (or rule of many, and those of the people) is counted for the best forme of gouernment?

Is it by reason of that <sup>h</sup> equalitie which is obserued & kept where the rule of the people beareth sway?



sway? when all are subiect to the lawes alike, and Magistrates placed by common suffrage, who iudge according to the lawes, and the exact rule thereof, referring all their counsels and consultations to the good of the Common-wealth, and become accountable to the same for the administration and gouvernement of such Cities, Townes, &c. as are committed to their charge? Or is it because that in a *Democracie* the the<sup>i</sup> gouvernement is more easie, mecke, and gentle, as the Orator would haue it? Or may this rather bee the reason, for that<sup>k</sup> many ioyned together, can better iudge of all matters then one alone. For it may very well bee thought, that in euery one of those many, there are certaine sparkes of *Vertue*, and excellencies of gifts, which concurring and put all together, must needs make an absolute iudgment.

<sup>i</sup> Demosthenes  
de Repub. Atti-  
ca.

<sup>k</sup> Buchanan's o-  
pinion de iure  
regni apud Sco-  
tos.

3. *It may be further demanded, wherefore diuers men (and those taken to haue beene of the wisest) haue fauoured an Aristocracie, affirming that to bee the best forme of gouvernement.*

<sup>l</sup> Petrus Bem-  
bus in his Ve-  
netian History.  
<sup>m</sup> The Aristoc-  
raticall go-  
uernments of  
the Spartans  
lasted 800.  
yeares. The  
Venetian state  
hath lasted a-  
boue 1100.  
yeares with-  
out any nota-  
ble trouble,  
tumult, or al-  
teration.

**W**As it because they thought it very like-ly, that the<sup>l</sup> counsels and consultations of the best men, excelling others in vertue and wisdom, should be the best and most auailable, and beneficiall to the weale-publique? Or was it because they found by experience, that the *Aristocraticall* state was more<sup>m</sup> durable then any other forme of gouernment? *Aristocracies* hauing

D

euer

<sup>n</sup> *Arist. Polit. 5.*  
 ° The opinion  
 of Machiavel,  
 lib. I. Disputat.  
 Cap. 5.

ever great store of good wits, which may bee fitted and accomodated to all times and occasions, better then other formes of gouvernement? Or might this rather bee their reason, because they obserued that this forme of gouvernement was not so subiect to<sup>n</sup> alteration, or to grow into tyranny? For to speake as they would haue the thing to be, ° though these few of the *Clarissimi* who sway the gouvernement, be naturally ambitious; notwithstanding when they see and consider that all the authoritie is in their owne hands, and by reason thereof that they surpasse and excell the rest of their people, they content themselves (for the most part) with this prerogative, and so raise no tumults, or stirre vp any troubles whereby the Common-wealth might bee vexed or disquieted for their ambitious humors.

And thus (Right Honorable) you see how that as euery one most fancied and affected this, or that kinde of gouvernement: so they yeelded reasons for the maintaining of their opinions? Wherein (in my conceit) they haue mist the Cushion, and vpon good grounds (as I hope) I may argue against them all. And thus for Argument sake I reason against their Monarchy.

Euery Monarch is either tied to rule, according to the lawes of the kingdome hee possesseth, or he is not; If he be not bound, then all men will confesse with me, that that Monarchy may easily degenerate, and grow into tyranny. But if the Monarch bee tied to obserue lawes, nothing letteth  
 (not.



(notwithstanding) but that forme of Commonwealth may not bee durable, 'especially when the kingdome commeth by succession. <sup>P</sup> For very fel-  
dome falleth it out, that to a wise and godly Fa-  
ther, a Sonne of that stampe, and endowed with  
like vertues, should succeed. Now, whenas by the  
peruerse, carelesse, or bad carriage of the Mo-  
narch toward his people, the manners of his sub-  
jects are once corrupted, it must of necessitie fol-  
low, that either the lawes are of small force, or  
none at all. And so farewell to that forme of go-  
uernment.

*P Dantes Poeta  
Italus.*

Against their *Democracie*, I this auerre, or (ra-  
ther) finally determine, That if any good Coun-  
cels or Decrees come from the people, they pro-  
ceed from them rather by meere chance, and ac-  
cidentally, then for any prime or principall in-  
tention of the Councellers. For the people being  
driuen by some extreame necessity, to runne such  
and such courses, or put in praetise those or these  
counsels, or being furthered by some memorable  
accident falling out in the nicke (as we say) may  
oftentimes decree things well and wisely, other-  
wise it is impossible for them so to doe? For they  
know not (for the most part) what they would  
haue, they aske what they know not, and when  
they haue obtained what they asked, by and by  
they spurne, kicke at it, and despise it: so that the  
prouerbe in them, and of them, is true, and euer  
will bee verified; *The people is a beast of many heads,  
wanering and enuious.* So that I may very safely



conclude, that this forme of gouernment is worst of all.

Against the *State Aristocraticall*, I this affirme, that experience hath made it manifest to the world, that those, who for a while haue iustly and vprightly gouerned the Common-wealth, not long after haue abused their power and authority to the gathering of riches, and getting possessions of lands into their hands, insomuch that they haue growne ambitious, earnestly thirsting after priuate reuenge, and the fulfilling of their owne filthy lusts and appetites, as appeared plainly in the *Aristocracie* of the *Romanes*, when after they grew weary to be gouerned by Consuls, and had set vp the *Decemvirate*, in the beginning of the second yeare of their gouernment, they were inforced to change that state into a *Democracie*, because the *Decemviri* ruled so villanously. Againe, it is recorded by antiquitie, that the sonnes of vertuous parents, who were, and did succcede in diuers gouernements, became extreame insolent, common lechers, and spend-thrifts of those patrimonies which their carefull parents had left vnto them: Vpon which grounds I conclude, That the *Aristocraticall* gouernment cannot stand long firme, and stable, much lesse to bee permanent and durable.

4 These things then being, as I haue said, and considering that euery forme of gouernmēt is so subiect to change & alteration, it were wel worth the labour to  
make



make a true Disquisition of this nice point, to wit, what forme of government were fittest for euery Kingdome and Country, whereby the welfare thereof might bee procured and continued.

TO determine this question (*Right Honourable*) were a very hard taske to be vndertaken and performed of any man, yet because I haue taken vpon to discourse of this subiect, I will in briefe shew your Lordship my opinion therein.

And first, I am verily perswaded, that this, or that forme of government, whether already established, or to be brought in, and established, in any Kingdome or Country, doth chiefly depend vpon the nature and disposition of that Kingdome or Country, into which it hath bene already, or is to be brought: For it would be a very hard matter to bring a free forme of government into that Country, who haue bene vsed to liue vnder a Monarch, as contrariwise, to reduce that people, to liue vnder the obedience and command of one absolute Ruler, who haue vsed to liue free of themselves, & to bee governed by their owne Lawes. The Easterne Countries not enduring to brooke the *Aristocraticall* or *Democraticall* State, were euer deuoted to liue vnder one sole Monarch. On the other side, no forme of government would please the *Athenians* and *Heluetians* (whom at this day wee call *Switzers*) but a *Democracy*: None the *Lacedemonians* but an *Aristocracy*. The *Syracusians* affected a tyranicall forme of government: Neither could

could any of these people euer bee perswaded to forsake that forme of gouernment which they had once chosen: Nay, which is more, they did with such deadly and implacable hatred, prosecute all those who erected, or set vp any other kinds of *Policies* to bee gouerned, and to gouerne by, that wheresoeuer, and whensoever, they became Conquerours, they altered and abrogated, that forme of Gouvernement, and brought in their owne forme.

Secondly, I vtterly deny all right formes of Common-wealthes, as the *Monarchy*, *Aristocracy*, and *Democracy*, to bee absolute and perfect: much lesse do I hold that any goodnesse can be in a *Tyranie*, *Oligarchy*, or *Ochlocracy*; For these last related, by reason of the multitude of euils which accompany them, are of, and in themselves alwaies euill, the Magistrates neuer regarding the common-good but their owne ends: The former likewise, although in themselves they are good (for that in all of them, the chiefe good of the Common-wealth, or State, either is, or ought to be sought) yet accidentally, they many times become euill; as well for that they last not long, as that they so easily degenerate.

To conclude therefore, I hold that forme of Common-wealth to bee best, which is compounded of the temper of all these, or at leastwise is so mixed of a *Monarchy* and *Aristocracy*, that one (indeed) for the Maiesty of the State should bee the chiefe Commander, but his power should be gouerned



gouverned, and his Councils ordered by the decrees and wisdom of the Senate: For by this meanes, the Prince should retaine his splendor and dignity, the Senate their power and authority, and the people their lawfull liberty.

SECT. I. CHAP. III.

Of the Prince, Court, and Courtiers, &c.

I *It may bee demanded why private men, can neuer well and rightly iudge of the affaires of Princes?*

**I**S it because they exactly<sup>a</sup> know not the matters of State, the ends of Princes, or how farre this, or that businessse, effected, or neglected, doth concerne them? Or may this rather bee the reason that<sup>b</sup> forasmuch as<sup>a</sup> *Guiccardine.* the counsels, purposes, and designes of Princes, differ so farre from the drifts and courses of private men, it is impossible that the selfe-same projects should be auailable to them both? For it (most what) so falleth out, that although matters of State, determinations of businessses, and the commodities or discommodities which may be expected<sup>b</sup> *Idem.*

expected to arise thereof, should be knowne as well to priuate men, as to Princes themselues, their applications, censures, and iudgements, notwithstanding touching the premisses, would be diuers, as their first ends and intentions were, which they had propounded to themselues.

- 2 *In the next place it may bee demanded, wherefore, as wee commonly reade in Histories, as out of Tacitus and others, that that man, whose aide and helpe a Prince hath made vse of to bring him to the Crowne, within a while after is neither liked nor loued of that Prince, but either is fed with the smoake of innouation, or made shorter by the head?*

*Philipus  
minans.*

**I**S it because that some Princes being naturally suspicious, do esteeme the faith of those to be fickle to them, which they haue proued to haue beene to the damage of others? Or is not that the reason, but this rather, that the very sight of them whose helpe they haue vsed to their rising, groweth odious vnto them, for that it seemeth to vp-braide them with the basenesse of their former meane fortunes? Or may it not be so neither, but for that it is<sup>e</sup> grieuous vnto some Princes to remember that they owe any thing, or that they are any waies beholding to their Subiects?

- 3 *It may further bee demanded, how that Prince, who hath bereaued another of his Kingdome, might*



*might behaue himselfe to enioy his new-got Empire with safety?*

**S** Shall hee effect this, if hee<sup>d</sup> affect him whom he hath so spoyled, with new fauours and benefites, endeavouring thereby to reconcile him, and binde him fast vnto him? But it is to bee feared, that old iniuries will hardly bee forgotten, by collating and bestowing of new benefites vpon the wronged, especially if the greatnesse of the iniuries, exceede the rate of the benefites, as it falleth out commonly in the case of Kingdomes. Or shall he bring this about the rather, if he<sup>e</sup> murder, and kill, all those whom he imagineth to stand in his way, or whom hee standeth in doubt of, least in time they may become his enemies? But if he take these courses, he must needs fall into some great mischiefe; for he shall ingulfe himselfe in the vast Ocean of the peoples hatred, and thereby weaken his owne power against the time he should haue most occasion to vse it.

*4 It may further bee demanded, why it so much importeth Princes, and great men, to be cantelous that they do not iniury, or reproach any man?*

**I** Sit for that hee who is wronged of those who are in eminent place, and authority, perceiuing himselfe to bee daily and houely shot at, and noted for the same, griueth the more therat, and so sets vp his rest to take a sharp reuenge? Or ought

E

they

<sup>d</sup> This was the error of *Seruius Tullius* King of the Romanes, who *Tarquinius Superbus* slew.

<sup>e</sup> This was the practise of *Selimus*, the Turkish Emperor, who being but a yonger brother, poysoned *Baiazet* his father, made away *Corcut* and *Acomat* his two brethren, &c. So dealt *Rich.* the 3. with his two nephewes the sonnes of *Edward* the 4. with the Duke of *Buckingham* likewise, and others.

<sup>f</sup> *Philippus Cominaus.*



<sup>g</sup> *Cominæus.*

they to be cautelous for this cause likewise, & least if the wronged hauing formerly retained vnto them, or made any dependency vpon them, shold vpon any trust committed vnto him, pay them home, in neglecting, or vtterly ouerthrowing their chiefeft busineses?

5 *It may further be demanded, why it greatly importeth a Prince, to bee Vertuous, Honourable of his word, iust, and of good Example among all men, as well Forreigners, as Domestiques?*

<sup>h</sup> *Xenophon in Pædia Cyri.*

<sup>i</sup> *Sen. l. de Clementia.*

<sup>k</sup> *Sen. Thieft.*

**I**S it for that he may be thought vnfit<sup>h</sup> to gouern, who is not better euery way then those who are to bee gouerned? Or is it not for that cause onely, but for that<sup>i</sup> his good name and fame likewise at home, and abroad is greatly blemished and stained, if the course of his life and dealings bee not currant? Or ought hee to bee such an one for the better stablishing of his Kingdome also? <sup>k</sup> For where there is no shame, care of doing of *Iustice, Sanctity, Piety, & keeping of promise*, that kingdom must needs bee vnstable, and the State tottering.

6 *It may be the same purpose further demanded, why a Prince ought to be iust, to make speciall reckoning of the administration thereof equally to his Subjects, ey, to do iustice vpon himselfe, if hee desire to be held for a good Prince?*

<sup>l</sup> *Plato in Polit.*

**I**S it for that<sup>l</sup> a Lawlesse Principallity, and loose gouernement is yrkesome to euery one (especial-  
ly



ly of the better sort) so that they do not delight, or haue any desire to liue vnder it? Or is it for that the constant and strict obseruation, and administration of Iustice, doth stablish and strengthen a Kingdome, as the<sup>m</sup> Oratour well perceiued, <sup>m Cic. Parad.</sup> who said that Iustice and Equity were the true conseruators of Common-wealthes and Cities? Or is it not onely for that iustice doth stablish a Kingdome, but for that it doth truely make a kingdome to be a Kingdome, giuing vnto it his very essence and being, whereby it is, that which it is? For take away Iustice, and what are Kingdomes but great Robberies? as well said the<sup>n</sup> learned Diuine. <sup>u August. de Ciuit. Dei lib. 4.</sup>

8 *It may further be demanded, why many Princes are very fearefull, suspicious, and iealous of their estates?*

**I**S it because that<sup>o</sup> Kingdomes are commonly <sup>o Attius.</sup> subiect to treacheries? Or is this rather the reason, for that the<sup>p</sup> nature of most Princes is prone <sup>p Sen. Oedip.</sup> to feare, and be iealous of their Estates? as well said the Poet, <sup>q Sen. in Agam.</sup> Kingdomes and Mariages brooke no riuals.

9 *It may further bee demanded, wherefore all credit, countenance, honors, and authority in Court, are for the most part slippery, and not to be trusted vnto?*

**H**Appeneth it thus by reason of the Fates vncertainty (as it pleaseth the<sup>r</sup> Historian to set <sup>r Tacit. 3. Annalium.</sup> downe)

<sup>f</sup> Tacit. 17. Annalium.

<sup>e</sup> Salust. In-  
gurb.

<sup>u</sup> Sen. in Hip-  
polito.

<sup>x</sup> Tacit. 1. An-  
nal.

<sup>y</sup> The saying  
of Constantine  
the Great.

downe) who auerreth, that Court-fauours, euen by decree of the destinies, are not alwaies lasting? Or might this rather be the reason, for that<sup>f</sup> Courtiers credites are (commonly) ypheld by others, and not by their owne strengths? Or not so neither, but for that these things thus fall out through the fault of the Princes, their Maisters, whom they serue, whose wils and pleasures as they are<sup>t</sup> vehement for the time, so they are very changeable, and oftentimes contrary to themselves?

IO Seeing that the<sup>u</sup> Court is so slippery a place, that a man shall hardly get fast footing: It may fitly bee demanded, by what Compasse a Courtier should saile, that hee may bee without all danger of shipwracke, whereby either his life may bee hazarded, his goods diminished, or his honour blemished?

SHall he attaine vnto those ends, if he show himselfe dutifull, obsequious, and respectiue of his Prince, as it pleased the<sup>x</sup> Historian to affirme? For by how much the seruant in the iudgement of his Maister, shall bee held more desirous and ready to please him, then another shall; by so much the more hee shall bee aduanced to honours and riches? Or may hee compasse his desires the better, if he be<sup>y</sup> seruiceable likewise, and not like the moathes, and caterpillars of the Court? Or may hee rather further his intents,

if



if he be bold spirited also? For shamefastnesse is an ill seruitour in a Princes Palace, as well said the<sup>z</sup> Poet. Or shall he be cautelous likewise, taking heed that whatsoeuer he well doth or performeth, he do it as<sup>a</sup> though he seemed not to do it, and without boasting or bragging? Or (to auoid enuy) shall he learne to<sup>b</sup> dissemble, cloake, and obscure his owne vertues, and proper gifts? Or shall hee, being any wayes aduanced by his Princes fauours, like the Moone,<sup>c</sup> acknowledge (oftentimes) that he hath receiued all the light of his glory, and grace of his rising, from that Sunne his maister? Or shall hee strue and endeouour to become very<sup>d</sup> patient, and<sup>e</sup> extreame wary likewise? He must be very patient, that he may beare iniuries the better, & not flie out, or run into passion vpon euery crosse he shall meet withall, or such distastes as shall be giuen him. He must bee cautelous, least he be taken in the traps of his fained friends, or secret, or open professed enemies.

<sup>z</sup> Sen. in Hippol.

<sup>a</sup> Velleius. 11.

<sup>b</sup> Tacit. 16. Annal.

<sup>c</sup> Tacit in Agric

<sup>d</sup> Sen. 11. de ira.

<sup>e</sup> Sen. Hippolit.

*II It may further be demanded, why it is better to liue with, and serue a prudent and wise Prince, then a foolish?*

**I**S it because that a<sup>f</sup> foolish Prince being (for the most part) very suspitious, thinketh that euery of his seruants goeth about to deceiue him, which to an *Honest* minde must needes be a great corrosiue? Or is it for that a<sup>g</sup> foolish Prince not vnderstanding his owne affaires, cannot make

<sup>f</sup> Philip. Cominaus. lib. 4.

<sup>g</sup> Idem ibidem.



<sup>h</sup> Phil. Com. lib.  
4.

<sup>i</sup> This was wel  
seene in the  
Duke of little  
Brittaine, who  
vsed onely Pe-  
ter Landoy.

difference of good seruice from bad, whereupon it commeth to passe, that his loue is turned into hatred, and his hatred into loue in a moment? Or is it not for these reasons onely, but for this likewise, that <sup>h</sup> those seruants which liue vnder a wise Prince, haue moe meanes affoorded them to retaine their maisters fauour, if they once haue had it, or to recouer it if they haue lost it, then it is possible they can haue, who liue vnder an Ideot, or foolish Prince? For no man almost dealeth in any thing with the Prince himselfe, but with his seruants, whom he changeth as often as he putteth on a cleane shirt.

12 To the same purpose it may further be demanded wherefore (notwithstanding) many Courtiers haue rather chosen to liue in the Courts of some great Prince, though a foole, then in the Palace of a lesse potent Prince, though neuer so wise.

<sup>k</sup> Lucas de Pen-  
na.

<sup>l</sup> Egisippus cum  
alijs, ut refert  
Guic.

Is it because that <sup>k</sup> it is true libertie (as some suppose) to liue vnder the command of a potent Prince? Or is it rather, as others affirme, for that the seruitors seruices are graced and beautified by the greatnesse and super-eminent dignitie of their maisters?

13 Seeing that none are borne Artists it may be demanded, what manner of Courtier is to be deemed and esteemed to be the better Crafts-maister in managing affaires of State?

Is



**I**Sh he the man who is <sup>m</sup> furnished with the knowledge of diuers tongues, well seene in Histories of the lawes of his owne and other Countries, that is religious, hath a quicke wit, a ripe iudgement, a fluent tongue, a grane stile, & is an excellent pen-man? Or is he rather to be so accounted, who is <sup>n</sup> smooth-tongued, gorgeously apparelled, a great feast-maker, an artificiall cosourer, a deepe dissembler, a whoore-maister, tale-bearer, flatterer, a priuy-whisperer, and one that is giuen to all kinde of villanie?

<sup>m</sup> Guiccard.

<sup>n</sup> Guic. & Tacit  
3. Annal.

*14 It may further be demanded, what might bee the best meanes wherby Princes may free themselves, from being abused by flatterie?*

**M**ay they effect this if they beware and take heed that they <sup>o</sup> grow not into contempt with their people? Or shall they bring their purpose better about, if they sit often in counsell, and touching those things which they propound to be consulted vpon, doe shew themselves <sup>p</sup> patient in hearing the truth, that their people may vnderstand that they will not be offended, if they freely speake their mindes, and confidently deliuer that which is true? Or may this likewise further their intents, if vpon the <sup>q</sup> perceiuing and finding out of some or other, who for some sinister respects (though towards themselves) haue held their peace, or forborne to speake the truth, they do either shew themselves to be greatly offended with them, or seuerely punish them?

<sup>o</sup> Tholoz. de Re-  
pub. lib. 22. cap. 8

<sup>p</sup> Plut. Apotheg.

<sup>q</sup> Machiavel his  
doctrine in his  
Prince.  
Cap. 23.

## SECT. I. CHAP. III.

Of a Kingdome : How it may be got, how kept, how it may be increased, how it may be made lasting or durable : And lastly, how it may bee lost, or over-throwne by hatred, contempt, &c.

I It may be demanded, by what wayes and meanes any Principallitie may be gotten, or conquered.

<sup>a</sup> Quintus Curtius. lib. 6.



Sit to be atchieued by <sup>a</sup> forraigne Armes, as it happened to *Alexander*, when hee had over-throwne *Darius* at *Arbella*? For after that victory, he neuer vsed in the full conquest of *Asia*, or other kingdomes, any other but for-

raigne forces, for the most part. Or is it rather to be gotten by an home-bred Army, seconed by the vertue and the manhood of the Leaders, and Captaines, as it fell to the lot of <sup>b</sup> *Cyrus*, *Romulus*,

<sup>b</sup> Xenophon.

and



and *Thesens*? Or may it bee attained by forraigne force also, seconded by *Fortunes* fauours, as it happened to *Francis Sfortia*, and *Borgia Caesar*? Or may it bee gotten by the putting in practise of some notorious and desperate designe, as it happened to *Agathocles*? Or may it be compassed by the fauour of the Citizens, as *Nabides* got his dominion?

2 In the next place it may bee demanded, how any Principality being once gotten, may be safely kept.

**M**AY this be effected if the Prince proue industrious, and accomodate himselfe to make and take aduantage of such accidents and occasions as time will continually affoord him, and in all other things to imitate and follow the steps of his Auncestors? Or may it be effected, if he neuer giue any offence to those, whose helpe he vsed in getting his dominion, but satisfie them according to their desires and hopes (if it be possible) as they haue conceiued of their owne worths? Or may he this way rather attaine therunto, if finding treason intended against him, he should most severely punish it, for terrour to the rest? Or may it this way be effected, if vpon the obtaining of his dominion, he<sup>c</sup> destroy all the bloud Royall, issues and allies, of the former Prince, and then obserue the Countrey customes without changing their lawes? Or may this rather bee effected, if hee that hath once gotten the soueraignty, remoue his seat

<sup>c</sup> The barbarous and inhumane practise of the Turkes at euery change of Prince.

F  
thither,

thither, and make his continuall residence in his new dominion? Or may this yet rather bee effected, if the Prince send Colonies into his new-gotten kingdome, or maintaine garrisons both of horse and foote, in the frontier townes? Or may hee better bring this to passe, if (after conquest made) dealing courteously with them, hee retire himselfe, and accept of an annuall pension, in the name of a tribute, leauing onely some small company behinde him, rather to nourish and encrease his subiects good opinion of him, then for any other end or purpose? or may he effect this the better, if he altogether should change their lawes and customes, and translate them to other remote places in the same kingdome, then those which before they inhabited? or may this rather be the way to purchase the fauour and good opinion of the Senators, or commons, hauing them alwayes addicted to his fortunes, taking vpon him valiantly and couragiously to defend those of his partie; against the other faction? or were not this the better course, to stand vpon his owne guard, hauing an army euer in a readinesse to chasten his subiects if they should rebel? Or finally, what if the

<sup>d</sup> This did *Craesus* among the *Lydians*, as *Polyb.* reporteth.

<sup>e</sup> This was the practise of the *Romans* in sending their *Pre-tors*.

<sup>d</sup> Conquerour should dispoyle the conquered of their weapons, and other meanes of defence or offence?

3 *It may further be demanded, how a new-got Kingdome may be enlarged?*

**S** Hall this be attained vnto, if the <sup>e</sup> Conquerour shew



shew himsef milde & gentle to his new subiects, thereby to allure the hearts of the neighbour borderers, to take a liking of his manner of gouernment? Or may it rather be effected, if<sup>f</sup> a great many of wise and warlike Princes do stil succeed one another in the selfe-same gouernement? Or may this be better done, if the conqueror haue a great care that *Military discipline* be alwaies vsed within his territories? Or should he rather go this way to worke, to <sup>g</sup> demolish the walles of the neighbour Cities, and cause the inhabitants to remoue their dwellings into his territories? Or shall he friendly inuite all strangers to come into his dominions, giuing them letters of safe conduct, and securing them of their dwelling safely vnder his protection? Or shall he combine with diuers neighbouring Cities, ioyning themselues with them as associats, so as the name of the Empire and gouernment, as likewise the authoritie of leuying of warre, may euer remaine with him, and bee proper vnto him? Or shall he make those whom hee hath conquered to<sup>h</sup> become vassals and slaues vnto him? Or might this be effected, if certaine Cities making<sup>i</sup> a league among themselues, that they will all be gouerned, and with equall dignities, and respect, should draw in other Cities to affect that kind of gouernment, and so to ioyne in the same league and amitie with them?

<sup>f</sup> This fell out in the *Macedonian* Monarchie.

<sup>g</sup> This & such like practises were the *Romanes*.

<sup>h</sup> Thus dealt the *Spartans*, *Venetians* and *Florentins* with them whom they conquered.

<sup>i</sup> The practise of the *Switzers* at this day.

4. *It may further be demanded, which might bee the best way to make a state durable and lasting?*

<sup>k</sup> All these things were fore-seene by *Lycurgus*, the *Lacedæmonian* Law-giuer.

SHall this be brought to passe, if by lawes it bee prouided for, vnder paine Capitall, that <sup>k</sup> no man should affect the Gouvernement? Or may it better bee effected, if the Prince being strong of himselfe, shall yet giue testimony to his neighbour Princes, that hee is not ambitious, nor seeketh by leuying of Armes, to enlarge his Dominions to any of their detriments? Or shall hee doe it yet the better, if by idlenesse, and vaine pleasures hee suffer not the mindes of his subiects to bee corrupted, or that they should grow too much effeminate?

5 *Considering that Kingdomes are strengthened as well by awfull Armes, as bright shining Vertue, it may bee demanded, by what kinde of force a Kingdome may best bee preserved, and made durable.*

SHall it bee made firme and stable by hauing an Armie euer in a readinesse, rather to offend then defend, according to the counsell of the Emperour *Seuerus*; which he gaue to his sons, <sup>l</sup> Agree among your selues, enrich the Souldier, and contemne all others? Or shall this bee the better way to make it stable, if the Prince<sup>m</sup> build many Forts, Towers, Citadels, Sconces, &c. within his Territories?

<sup>l</sup> Sic habetur apud *Dionem* in *vita eius*.

<sup>m</sup> So did the *Florentines* to keepe *Pisa* and *Francis Sforcia* to conserue *Millaine*, but not to much purpose.

6 *Seeing that hatred once conceined against a Prince by his subiects, is the next way to bereaue him of his Crowne, it may bee demanded, how the Prince*



*Prince may run into such hatred, and what meanes  
hee might best vse to auoid it?*

**M**AY hee runne into this hatred by his owne <sup>n Mach. de Re-</sup> boundlesse ambition, seeking to bring in- <sup>pub. lib. 2.</sup> to bondage, and the great desires of his Cittizens to continue free? Or may hee come hated of his Subiects, by reason of <sup>o Mach. de Re-</sup> the iniuries hee hath of- <sup>pub. lib. 3. cap. 6.</sup> fered them, either in seeking their liues, touching their honours, or preying vpon them for their riches? Or rather may it this way come to passe that hee be hated, for that he hath <sup>p Cic. Phillip. 2.</sup> giuen cause to the Subiects to feare him, least he do them a mischief? For, to feare, desire of reuenge is a perpetuall companion. And this prouerbe is most true, whom a man feareth, him hee hateth; whom he hateth, he would gladly bee rid of? Or may this bee the reason hee runneth into such hatred, for that hee is <sup>q Tholo. de Re-</sup> vitious; as cruell, couetous, sacrili- <sup>pub. lib. 22.</sup> gious, &c.

*7 It may bee further demanded, how the inflicting  
of seuerer punishments vpon offenders, may bee  
freed from hatred?*

**S**HALL the Prince free himselfe there-from, if hee bee slow to punish delinquents, and thereby giue testimony to the world, that his intent is rather to heale, and bind vp a soare, then to launch and make it bleed by the arme of Iustice? Or shall hee this way free himselfe, if hee neuer punish, <sup>r Sen. de Clem.</sup> but

<sup>r</sup> *Sen. de Clem.* but<sup>f</sup> when the safety of the Common-wealth cal-  
 leth vpon him so to do, or at least his Subiects be  
 so perswaded? Or shall hee this way rather bee  
<sup>t</sup> *Cic. 2. de Offic.* freed, if hee<sup>t</sup> neuer exact to take punishment of  
 delinquents in an angry moode? Or may he this  
<sup>u</sup> *Sen. 1. de Clem.* way auoide his Subiects hatred, if hee<sup>u</sup> shew not  
 any signes of reioycing, when hee inflicteth pu-  
 nishment vpon offendours, as though he thirsted  
 after bloud, or were delighted with the shedding  
 of it? Or rather may this be his way, that when  
<sup>x</sup> *Tacit. Agric.* many haue offended, hee do not<sup>x</sup> now and then  
 call them to account, as hee listeth, holding them  
 in a perpetuall feare, but take his aduantage  
 against all, and punish all forthwith? Or rather by  
 this way may he be freed therefrom, by not deu-  
 ising any new kind of punishments, but inflicting  
 those which haue beene in vse, according to  
 old and ancient custome of the Country? Or may  
 he this way likewise free himselfe, if hee be very  
 sparing in punishing of delinquents, and when he  
 doth it, hee might bee thought to command it to  
 bee inflicted against his will, but neuer to bee a  
 spectator thereof? Or finally, may hee thus free  
 himselfe there-from, if to please his subiects, hee  
<sup>y</sup> *Tacit. 13. Annal.* diuert the force of his fury another way, <sup>y</sup> cau-  
 sing such as haue beene his counsellours, and per-  
 swaders to wrong the Common-wealth, to taste  
 the cup of his choler, by inflicting seuerer pu-  
 nishments vpon them, or deliuering them into  
 the peoples hands to be tormented?



8 *It may further be demanded how a Prince may free himselfe of that hatred which hee hath purchased, by vexing his Subiects with Impositions, Taxes, Tallages, &c. which are commonly grievous to them to beare?*

**M**AY this be done if the Prince perswade the people<sup>z</sup> that if they will live in peace and out of danger, that it is altogether necessary they endure such impositions, which if they should not, it were impossible for them to live in safety, or the State to be durable? For<sup>a</sup> peace is not purchased but by Armes, nor Armes maintained but by Souldiers well paid, nor can the Souldier be paid without leuying of Subsidies? Or shall the Prince free himselfe, if hee command the gatherers of such Impositions, that they<sup>b</sup> neither by force, nor fraude, exact more of the Subiect, then anciently hath beene accustomed to be paid? Or shall hee rather this way auoide their hatred, if sparingly, as iust occasion inforceth him, hee impend and lay out such treasure, as hath beene leuied by Subsidies, that his Subiects may see and perceiue, that hee is but a Steward, for the good of the Common-wealth, and no riorous spender, or exhauster of the treasure so gathered: or that he hath any desire to conuert any of it, to his owne vse, or ends? Or shall hee thus rather free himselfe, by taking of a course, that<sup>c</sup> iust and vni-  
forme contribution be made according to euery mans

<sup>z</sup> Tacit. 13. Annal.

<sup>a</sup> Tacit. 4. hist.

<sup>b</sup> Idem. Ibid.

<sup>c</sup> Plin. Paneg.

mans ability, neuer by fauour sparing one man, that the burthen may lye the heauier vpon another mans shoulders?

*9 It may further be demanded, how, and by what meanes, a great and potent Subiect, may auoide and shunne, the hatred of his Prince?*

<sup>d</sup> This was the practise of Antipater, one of Alexanders Captaines, as Q. Curt. reporteth.

<sup>e</sup> This was the practise of Iosab, Davids Generall.

**M**ay this be effected, if this great Noble man make himselfe first odious to the people? Or shall hee better effect it, if hee shew himselfe very dutifull and obsequious to his Prince, praising all his good deeds, and sayings, and craftily dissembling whatsoeuer is bad in him? Or shall hee attaine therevnto, if hee<sup>d</sup> neuer proiect to make himselfe great, strengthen himselfe with friends, or seek to bee maister of greater riches, then is conuenient for his estate? Or if fortune haue cast all these things vpon him, that hee acknowledge continually, that hee hath receiued, gained, and gotten them, by the grace and fauour of his Prince, whose they are, whensoeuer he shall please to make vse of them? Or shall hee this way auoide his Princes displeasure, if he haue a speciall care to<sup>e</sup> attempt or do nothing, without consulting with, or obtaining the consent of his Prince, though otherwise hee were assured that hee could preuaile in his attempts, and that it would turne to the good of his Country? Or shall hee this way shunne it, if being for a certaine time made Deputy, Lieutenant General, or raised  
and



and euected to any other speciall place and dignity, he<sup>f</sup> forth-with at the end, and expiration of his time resigne his office to his Princes hands, and in no wise seeme to be desirous that it be prolonged, or continued vnto him, least hee should seeme to be sick of the swelling humours of *Ambition*? Or may hee this way auoide it, if hauing wonne, and prouing victor in diuers battels, hee impute the glory of his Conquests to the good fortune of his Prince, desiring that the victorious Army may now bee led by some other, whom the Prince shall thinke good of, and retiring, put himselfe into his Princes protection, carrying himselfe in a moderate fashion, as free from pride and ambition? By this onely meanes a great Generall, though suspected and feared of his Prince, may so mollifie and lenifie his minde, that hee shall haue no cause to thinke ill of him, but shall make to himselfe great and apparant reasons to reward him for his good seruices.

<sup>f</sup> The praise of Antipater. and Lucius Lucullus.

10 *It may further bee demanded, why euery Kingdome is so fickle and unstable?*

**I** Sit because that euery<sup>s</sup> Principality is the object of Fortune, who can neuer be daunted, but challengeth the like priuiledge against Empires, as Emperours. Or may this bee the reason rather, because it is exposed to such, and so many hatreds, as the Tragical<sup>h</sup> Poet sung, The Maker of the world coupled these two together; *Hatred and a Kingdome?*

<sup>s</sup> Sen. Oedip. Idem. etiam Ep. xciij.

<sup>h</sup> Senec. Theb.

*h Attius.*

Kingdome. Or may this be the cause, for that it is subiect to so many<sup>h</sup> treasons, treacheries, &c. for there bee very many in a Kingdome which bee naught and vnfaithfull, few good?

*i Senec. Theb.*

II To the same purpose it may bee demanded, why among the Grecians and Romanes, a Kingdom was so hatefull for the most part?

*k Idem Agam.**l Idem in Hippolito.**m Salust. ad Caesarem.**n Cicero pro Cluent.**p Arist. 5. Polit.*

**D**Id this come to passe by reason of the<sup>k</sup> manners, and crooked dispositions of their Princes, who being (for the most part) licentiously giuen, thought it was a great pledge of their Kingdome, and badge of their Royaltie, that it was lawfull for them to do that which no body else might? Or being selfe-wild, or proud, <sup>l</sup> accounted it no lesse dishonour vnto them, to be drawne to yeeld to any thing (though neuer so iust) against their wils, then to be vanquished in battell? Or is not the fault so much in the dispositions & wils of kings, as in the harsh<sup>m</sup> natures of the Subiects, being stubborn, refractary, and hardly wonne to yeeld due obedience? For no man willingly, would draw in another mans yoake.

12 Seeing that authority is as it were the<sup>n</sup> spirit by which euery Common-wealth is gouerned, being flatly opposed to contempt, which may bee called the<sup>o</sup> bane and destruction of all Kingdomes, it may be demanded, how a Prince may behaue himselfe, that hee neither fall into contempt amongst his owne Subiects, or forraigne States?

Shall



SHall he effect this, if the<sup>p</sup> fashion of his go-<sup>p</sup> Tacit. II. hist.  
uernement proue not too remisse, and gentle,  
whereby he may be thought to be negligent in or-  
dering affaires of State? Or shall hee performe it  
the rather, if hee<sup>q</sup> shew no leuity in the forme of<sup>q</sup> Idem Ibidem.  
his gouernment, but constantly gouerne, accor-  
ding to the Lawes and Decrees of the Common-  
wealth? Or shall he effect this likewise, if he shew  
himselſe firme in his purposes, constant in his pro-  
mises, and that hee hath no<sup>r</sup> notable touch of mu-<sup>r</sup> Idem Ibidem.  
tability in his disposition? Or shall hee bring this  
to passe, if (curiously) pondering things past, ex-  
pending, and well weighing things present, and  
prouidently fore-seeing things to come, hee doe  
timously consult, and determine, to bestow ho-  
nours on<sup>f</sup> such men, as for their worth haue de-<sup>f</sup> Idem Ibidem.  
serued; not vpon euery fawning and obsequious  
fauourite, or such as can purchase them with mo-  
ney? Or may hee doe this the better, if Fortune  
prope a mother vnto him, and not a step-dame?  
Or shall he finally effect this likewise, if he first<sup>t</sup> re-<sup>t</sup> Tacit. 15. An-  
presse his owne lusts, and inordinate affections, <sup>nal.</sup>  
giuing thereby his Subiects examples to follow  
him in the like, and causing Forreigners to admire  
him therefore?

13 *It may be further demanded how an Empire, or  
Kingdome may be finally lost?*

Commeth it thus to passe, by a kind of a<sup>u</sup> fatall<sup>u</sup> Tholoz. lib. 22  
necessity, when this or that State hath come <sup>de repub.</sup>



to his full period? or not so, but rather for this cause, for that many, though they know how to conquer, yet have not the meanes to manage the estate they have conquered; or if they did, want (notwithstanding) power and meanes to retaine it in obedience, whereby it must needs come to passe, that they must loose their new-gotten Dominion? Or may this rather bee the cause, for that it oftentimes falleth out, through the<sup>x</sup> corrupt manners of the conquered, that the home-bred Subject is infected by them, and so, by little and little, degenerating into wantonnesse, giue occasion to some neighbouring war-like Prince to inuade them, and take away their whole Dominion? Or rather may this bee the reason, for that the Conquerour doth not gouerne the conquered according to their auncient Lawes and Customes, but seeketh by all meanes to abolish the same? Or is it for this cause, for that the Prince neglecteth the<sup>z</sup> exercise of Military Discipline: or if he do professe it, yet doth it so coldly, as no good redoundeth to himselfe, or the Common-wealth thereby? Or further might this bee the cause, for that the Prince is hated of his Commons; or hauing the to his friends, yet cannot secure himselfe, or his estate, from the power and force of his Nobility? Or to conclude, may this be the reason, for that hee<sup>a</sup> permitteth a forraigne Prince to bring too many, and too great forces into his Kingdome, whereby first seizing of this or that place, at their pleasures, by little and little they become Maisters of the whole?

<sup>x</sup> This was verified in the Romanes possessing *Capua*.

<sup>y</sup> The fault of *Tarquinius Superbus*.

<sup>z</sup> This is assigned by *Machiavel, lib. de Prin. cap. 24.* to bee the cause why the Princes of *Italy* lost their Seignories.

<sup>a</sup> This was the error of *Lewis* the 12. King of *France*, in permitting *Pope Alexander* the 6. to possesse *Flaminia*.



SECT. I. CHAP. V.

Of Councell, Councillours, and the choosing of them: Of running middle courses, the good which redoundeth to a Prince being well aduised, and counselled, and how he should discern good counsell from bad aduice.

*It may be demanded how a Prince may behaue himselfe in choosing of his Councillours, that hee be not deceived in his election?*



Shall he best effect this, if he choose them from among his<sup>a</sup> home-bred subiects? or shall hee doe it the better if withall hee make choyce of such as be<sup>b</sup> faithfull, of honest life and conuersation, generally skilfull of the<sup>c</sup> natures, matters, and passages of other Countries, and in particular, skilfull in the lawes, customes and natures of his owne<sup>d</sup> For it were a shame for

<sup>a</sup> Tholoz. lib. 24.

<sup>b</sup> Plin. Paneg.

<sup>c</sup> Arist. 6. Ethic. Cap. 27.

<sup>d</sup> Cicero 2. de orat.

a Councillour to a Prince to be skilfull of the customs of other nations, and to be a stranger in his owne Common-wealth: or shall he compasse this the better if he make choyce of<sup>e</sup> graue and auncient men, as also of such as haue<sup>f</sup> beene tossed and tried with the variety of Fortune, hauing therby learned to carry themselues both in weale & woe? Or lastly, shall the Prince neuer admit of any for his Councillours, but such as<sup>g</sup> generally are accounted wise and vertuous? For particular men may deceiue and bee deceiued, but no one man can deceiue all men, neither hath any man bene deceiued of all men.

<sup>e</sup> *Salust. Catil.*

<sup>f</sup> *Idem in frag.*

<sup>g</sup> *Plin. Paneg.*

2 *Againe it may further be demanded, how a Prince may behaue himselfe in his Consultations, that he may grow wise thereby, and so be accounted?*

<sup>h</sup> *Capitolinus de Marco Antonio.*

<sup>i</sup> *Vigetus lib. 3.*

SHall hee effect this, if hauing wise Councillours to aduise him, hee apt and accomodate himselfe to follow their directions, and what they haue maturely deliberated and concluded vpon, hee forthwith put in practise and execution? Or shall hee better effect this, if sitting in Councell himselfe, he propound, and heare them with patience and discretion debate the matter, and<sup>h</sup> neuer seeme to be angry, or striue to maister and ouer-rule their opinions, though they determine cleane contrarie to his owne humours, minde and desire? Or shall he rather bring this to passe, if being able to<sup>i</sup> containe himselfe, and keepe close his  
owne



owne Councils and intentions, he doe (indeede) propound what ought to be done to all, or the most of his Counsell to consider of; but what he will doe, to communicate it with very few, or rather none, but advise onely with himselfe? Or shal he rather performe this, if he grant free liberty of speach, neither doe too much affect those <sup>k</sup> soft and silken words of the Court, which his flatterers will be ready to claw him withall; knowing that they will please his humours? Or finally shall hee effect this, if with indifferencie, and all alike equality, he heare euery mans opinion, neuer <sup>l</sup> rewarding any counselling well, least for the hope of gaine, they might vpon sinister respects (at any time) decline from the right, nor <sup>m</sup> punish any (though they should counsell ill (so they do it not of maliciousnesse) for so he shall euer want Counsellours, if it be dangerous to giue counsell?

<sup>k</sup> Quint. Curt. lib. 8.

<sup>l</sup> Thucid. lib 3.

<sup>m</sup> Quint. Curt. lib. 3.

3 *It may further be demanded, why it is so exceeding auailable to a Prince, to haue his counsels and determinations kept secret?*

**I**S it because that if they were <sup>n</sup> knowne, they might be preuented and hindered? Or is it for this respect rather, because his honour and estimation both at home and abroad, is thereby much increased and augmented? Or not so much for the former reasons neither, but for that if his determinations were once knowne, <sup>o</sup> many men pricked forward with enuy, would detract from his wisdom

<sup>n</sup> Guiccardine

<sup>o</sup> Idem.

dome, blaming him that hee put not his intentions sooner in execution, though hee could not (happily) finde fit opportunity seruing thereunto?

*4 It may further bee demanded, what course a Prince might best take, that hee might not erre in his Consultations?*

*P Tholoz lib. 24.*

*G. Guiccardine*

*Idem.*

**S**hall he performe this, if hee fully vnderstand the nature of the businesse, which is to be deliberated vpon? Or shall he do it the better, if vnderstanding the matter, whereof to consult, hee constantly determine with himselfe rather to respect (cautelously) the extreames, and finall ends of businesse, then to regard middle courses, much lesse to run them? Or shall hee also effect this, if hee obserue and marke how<sup>r</sup> wisely and prudently his aduersarie (if any he haue) behaue himselfe in those things, which concerne his honour, profit or safety? Or shall he rather accommodate and apply his counsels to the nature, manners and condition of his aduersarie, and by that meanes learne out and expiscare what might be likely that he will attempt against him? Or shall hee compasse these things the better, if in all his counsels and deliberations concerning the Common-wealth, he rather propound to himselfe how the honor, dignitie and splendor thereof may bee augmented, then what profit might thereby redound vnto it?



5 *It may further be demanded, what is chiefly required of Senators, that they may giue wholesome counsell.*

**M**AY they effect this, if they be<sup>f</sup> men fearing God, making his plaine & euen lawes the strict and straight rule of their consultations? For seeing it is<sup>t</sup> God alone, which sustaineth and upholdeth Common-wealths, it were very fit that he should be made the chiefe head, and director of the counsels thereof. Or may they do it the better, if standing for the<sup>u</sup> libertie of themselves, and the Common-wealth, they do stoutly and courageously, not faintly and fearefully pronounce and deliuer their mindes and opinions, least they might rather be thought to runne with the Fortune of the Prince, then with him, or the good of the Common-wealth? Or may they also effect this, if they shew themselves<sup>x</sup> modest, and of a quiet disposition? Or may they likewise effect it the better, if they can<sup>y</sup> keepe their owne counsels? For it is very certaine that no great matter can be looked for at his hands, who will vent what hee should hold in? Or finally, may this better be performed, if choyce be made of such Councillors which haue<sup>z</sup> no particular interest in those things which are to be consulted vpon? For no man in his owne cause, can speake, thinke, or iudge vprightly, because euery man therein will be partiall.

<sup>f</sup> Plin. Paneg.

<sup>t</sup> Tholoz. lib. 24.

<sup>u</sup> Tacit. 1. Hist.

<sup>x</sup> Tacit. 3. Hist.

<sup>y</sup> Quint. Curt. lib. 4.

<sup>z</sup> Tholoz. lib. 24. de repub.

6 *Considering that middle courses (for the most part)*

*H*

*prone*

*prone unfortunate, it may be demanded why notwithstanding the running of a middle course being propounded by some one or other in pubicke deliberations, it is (most what) embraced, followed, and put in execution?*

<sup>a</sup> *Fran. Guich.*

**C**ommeth it to passe through the ill<sup>a</sup> disposition and worse affection of some addicted to faction and opposition, who perceiuing that their owne conceits cannot passe currant, had rather giue way to, and allow of that which is worse, not extreame (least hee should seeme to oppose) but different in a lesse distance, that thereby they may seeme to haue (in part) assented?

<sup>b</sup> *Idem.*

Or is it not for this reason alone, but for that likewise the other aduisers,<sup>b</sup> least they should displease some prime-man, who hath propounded a middle course of proceedings, will likewise run along with him, and approue of his deuise? Or rather is this the reason why such middle courses are by some no sooner propounded then approved, because (for the most part) prouident and wary, especially auncient and aged Statists, do approue of that course which they imagine to bee least violent and dangerous, and incline to the meane, as being the sweeter and more passable without noyse or Nuisance.

7 *Seeing that the close minds, wils and ends of Counsellours be strange, diuers, and for sinister respects, priuately kept to themselves, for (oftentimes) upon*  
pro-



*pounding of matters to bee consulted vpon,<sup>c</sup> one thing is spoken, another thing thought and meant, whereby the mindes and opinions (onely) of others may be discovered; it may here be demanded, how a Prince may iudge whether his Councillours aduise him well or no?*

<sup>c</sup> This was the practise of Torlton Archbishop of Canterbury, against Edward the second, by whose aduice his son was sent into France, who ioyning with his mother & Mortimer, became the head and Captaine of the Rebels against his owne father.

<sup>d</sup> Mach. in Prin.

<sup>e</sup> Tholo. lib. 24.

<sup>f</sup> Idem ibidem.

**S**hall hee know this by the<sup>d</sup> disposition of the Councillor? For he that more respecteth himselfe then his Prince, & in the carriage of any matter regards his owne priuate more then the good of the Common-wealth, as long as hee beareth this minde, he can neuer proue a faithfull Councillour, nor one whom the Prince or State may trust or rely vpon. Or shall hee vnderstand this by the<sup>e</sup> frequent vse & experience he hath had of his Councillours in the like busineses falling out ill, or well? Or shall he rather come to the knowledge hereof by making an<sup>f</sup> exact search and disposition how matters are carried and disposed of within his owne territories? Or shall he rather come to this knowledge by the frequent reading of Histories? or by the apprehending or comprehending of these two Principles, *What is Profitable, What is Honest*. Which two indeed are the bounds and grounds of truth, and of that worthy wisdom and iudgement which ought to be in a Senator.

## SECT. I. CHAP. VI.

## Of Example, the vse and abuse thereof in a Common-wealth.

*1 It may bee demanded, why subiects (for the most part) <sup>a</sup> frame & conformethemselues to the fashion of their Princes?*

*a claudian.*

*b Plin. Paneg.*



Sit for that both the <sup>b</sup> eyes of the minde, and the body, (for the most part) looke upwards, and stand (as it were) at gaze at greatnesse and eminencie, tending and bending the whole man to *dance* as they *pipe*? Or is it because

*c Tacit. 3. Annal* Examples vrge and enforce more then Lawes can do, seeing it is the nature of man, rather to be led of his owne accord; then to be cōpelled? Or is it rather for that <sup>d</sup> Example in Princes is a kind of secret law? For it fareth and falleth out thus (for the most part) with their acts, that what they doe, they euen seeme to command it.

*d Quintilian  
decl. 4.*

*Againe it may be demanded, why in reforming of a Common-wealth, the producing of examples of the most*



*most famous and illustrious men, for vertue in the same do very much auaille?*

**I**S it because that such men being compelled by no Lawes, yet of their owne accord, and free-will, acting, exercising, and exhibiting, singular and rare examples of vertue, do excite and stirre vp such as bee good, to follow them, and those which are bad, they doe either make them ashamed, or discourage them from going on in their lewdnesse? Or is it rather for this, that when by long proceffe of time, there hath bene no exemplary punishment inflicted vpon offenders, men grow regardlesse of Lawes, and the number of delinquents so increase, that the Magistrate is afraid to punish them? Then one *Manlius Torquatus* to punish his owne sonne; or a *Quintus Fabius* to bee accused and condemned for ioyning battell with the enemy, without the *Dictators* leaue; and such examples, do much bridle and repress other mens insolencies.

3 *It may further bee demanded, why hee that iudgeth by examples is commonly deceiued?*

**I**S it for that<sup>e</sup> all the selfe-same reasons and circumstances in the like actions, do seldome, or neuer concurre, and meete againe? Or is it because the<sup>f</sup> like actions are not alwaies gouerned with the like wisdom<sup>e</sup> and discretion? Or may this bee the reason rather, because<sup>g</sup> Fortune at all

*Franciso. Guiccb.*

*Idem.*

*Idem.*

times, playeth not her part alike, but now and then faileth her fauorites?

SECT. I. CHAP. VII.

Of Wits, Manners, and Dispositions: of diuers Cities, Countries, and Nations, as well free as seruile.

1 *It may bee demanded what kind of wits, may bee termed the best wits.*

*Guicch.*



As such bee counted for the best, which are<sup>a</sup> more stirring, sharpe, and acute, fiery and subtile, then ordinary? But these noble and excellent wits (for the most part) do proue very crosse, and are oftentimes the cause of much disquietnesse, turmoile, and trouble to him who is indued therewith. Or may those rather bee taken for the best, which though<sup>b</sup> more blunt, yet are more certaine and lasting, and (for the most part) are more fortunate then the other?

*Idem.*

2 *It may further be demanded, why in one and the selfe.*



*selfe-same Citie, there may be found many distinct families, whose manners and conditions are particular to themselves; as wee read amongst the Romanes, that the Manlij were euer sterne and seuer, the Publicolæ courteous and gentle, the Appij proud and ambitious, &c.*

**C**ommeth this to passe, by reason of the diuersity of their temperatures? But that (as it may bee thought) might be changed and altered, by the variety of Marriages. Or may this rather be the cause, for that euery Family hath a peculiar manner of bringing vp their children? for this commonly holdeth true, <sup>c</sup> whatsoeuer manners and opinions, are instilled into the minds of youth in their infancy, they will hardly or neuer bee removed, but continue with them euen to their old age.

<sup>c</sup> Mach. Disput. de Repub. lib. 3. cap. 46.

**3** *It may bee further demanded, why<sup>d</sup> diuers Nations, at the first assault, or onset giuen, seeme to bee magnanimious, and very fierce and forward to the battell, but within a while after doe grow very fearefull, and turne Cowards?*

<sup>d</sup> Liu. in his bookes affirmeth this of the Frenchmen.

**M**ay the cause consist in any peculiar affect in their natures? But it is possible that <sup>e</sup> nature from day to day, may bee corrected and amended? Or might this rather bee the reason, that such Nations being <sup>f</sup> without order or exercise of Military Discipline, are not enabled

<sup>e</sup> Mach. disput. Cap. 36.

<sup>f</sup> Idem Ibidem.



bled with such ordinary manhood, as may establish their hearts and mindes, making them to conceiue an assured hope of victory, and therefore if they be not vanquishers in the first assault, they straight waies quit the field? And this (vnder correction) I take to be the true reason of their fearefulnesse and running away.

4 *It may further bee demanded, wherefore diuers men (euen lewd persons) hauing many times occasions offered them, to commit some memorable and notable villany, notwithstanding (for the most part) they dare not attempt it, or put it in practise, and execution?*

*3 Mach. disp.  
lib. I. cap. 27.*

*2 Idem Ibidem.*

*3 Idem Ibidem.*

**I**S it for that they are afraid least they should incurre the note of infamy? But the greatnesse of the thing, might (happily) couer the badnesse of the fact, and likewise protect the party from danger. Or do they abstaine from perpetrating and committing such horrtble villany, by reason of their<sup>h</sup> owne in-bred goodnesse, or nice touch of their conscience? But such godly and holy motions do neuer enter into the hearts of such lewd loffels. Or may this rather bee the reason, for that by nature, it is not afforded to the most men, to be<sup>i</sup> absolutely euill, or perfectly good?

5 *It may further be demanded, why there should bee such, and so great difficulty, in chaunging or amending old customes, though most men (conuicted secretly*



*cretly in their consciences by evident truth) should confesse they were altogether vnprofitable, and dangerous to the Common-wealth to continue them?*

**M**ay this bee the reason, for that although some good Citizens, or Patriots, foreseeing the danger, do perswade the change thereof, yet they should not be able fully to turne the peoples mindes, by reason of others oppositions? Or may this rather be the cause, for that most men stand so affected, and affectionated, to their auncient course of liuing, that they would not willingly depart there-from? Or may this bee the reason of the difficulty of amending euill customes, for that there is euer a want of proportionable meanes agreeable to the Lawes, to bring that businesse about, so that they must bee driuen to flie to new courses altogether, which seldome proue fortunate? Or may this rather bee the reason, for that if some few, or any one man, should go about to change the forme of gouernement, it should bee necessary for him, first by force to inuade the State, and then to seize the liberties thereof into his hands, which might bee thought not to bee the part of a good man, and therefore hee will rather desist from his purpose, then do his Cittizens so much good? Or may this bee a further reason, for that the most men are perswaded, that there can scarcely be that man found, who hauing once brought a State vnder subiection, by ill  

I

meanes,

meanes, would afterwards vse that power and authority which hee had so ill gotten, to the benefite and good of the people?

SECT. I. CHAP. VIII.

Of Benefites, and when to bee bestowed: Of Ingratitude, and how a friend may be purchased that a man may trust vnto.

I *It may bee demanded when Benefites are to bee bestowed vpon a man?*

<sup>a</sup> Mach. disp. lib. primo, cap. 23.



ARE they to bee collated vpon him<sup>a</sup> iust at that time, when the bestower of them is compelled so to doe, as needing the present help of such a man, or for some priuate end to himsele best knowne? But this manner of giuing should

seeme to be very extrauagant, and distastefull, to the receiuer, as thinking that they were collated vpon him by reason of the parties necessity, which once serued, he would neuer conferre more vpon him. Or are they not so to bee collated vpon any man, but<sup>b</sup> timously rather, before hee which may haue

<sup>b</sup> Idem Ibidem.



haue need of them, shall haue occasion to vse them, or the Collator thereof the person?

2 *It may further be demanded, wherefore they who haue<sup>e</sup> best deserued of a Common-wealth are (oftentimes) worst recompenced and requited?*

**I**S this the reason, for that<sup>d</sup> there is nothing lesse lasting then the very name of a Benefite? Or is this rather the cause, for that it is<sup>e</sup> appropriate and peculiar to certaine Common-wealths, so to enuy those which excell in vertue and goodnesse, as they themselues being not able to follow and imitate them therein, seeke to spoile them of their gouernement and Empire? Or may this rather be the reason, that some<sup>f</sup> standing too much vpon their owne merites, haue borne themselues too proudly against the State, or their owne society? Or might this likewise bee the cause, for that those, who either by their rare exploits, or cunning ambition, creepe into the fauour of the people at home, and hunt after renowne and admiration abroad, may seeme to dimme the glory of their Princes, who greatly desire to be accounted well-deseruing of their owne people, as those to whom it more properly belongeth, and therefore they must needs oppose such, and grow in distaste of them? Or is it for that all men generally by their owne corrupt nature, are lesse prone, prompt, and ready to requite a good turne, then to reuenge an iniury? Or may this rather bee the

<sup>e</sup> As Charondas amongst the Aeginetians, Themistocles amongst the Athenians, Camillus, Scipio, &c. among the Romans, were imprisoned, banished, or put to death.

<sup>d</sup> Pindarus.

<sup>e</sup> This was proper to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.

<sup>f</sup> Philip. Comin.

5 Vpon this very conceite the Venetians put to death *Lauderanus*, because hee pacified a commotion by his owne authority; as *Petrus Bem bus* reporteth in his *Venetian History*.

reason for that the Prince, or State, groweth into suspicion of such kinde of men, least they should affect innouation, or seeke to tyrannise?

3 *It may further bee demanded, why kindnesse, and good will, are oftentimes requited with ingratitude, and vntthankfulnesse?*

**I**S it because that he which neither can, nor hath any desire to remunerate him, to whom hee is so much indebted, will either forget them, or perswade himselfe, and the world, that no such kindnesse were offered vnto him, or receiued by him? Or may this be the reason, that those men, who haue beene (as it were) driuen, and by fatall necessity compelled to receiue kindnesse of other men, should afterwards grow ashamed of it, that they should bee thought to haue had neede of such meanes?

4 *Seeing that no man can deny, but that the use of friends is such, and so great, that many times a man may bee driuen to relye his whole estate thereupon; It may bee demanded, how a man may bee ascertained, that hee hath purchased a true friend?*

*Guiccardine.*

**S**Hall hee giue confidence to him, whom hee hath bound by grace and benefites? Or shall hee trust him, who hath any waies neede of his helpe? Or shall hee rather repose his confidence



in him who is bound <sup>i</sup> vnto 'him', by hauing equall profite and share in any businesse, which they shall ioyntly attempt and obtaine? <sup>*Pindarus.*</sup>

SECT. I. CHAP. IX.

Of Estimation and Credit, of Authoritie, publique and priuate, Seueritie, strictnesse of Government, Constancie, Pietie, and Prouidence.

*I Seing Authoritie is the prop of kingdomes, and that it is of the most men confessed, that the maiesty of an Empire consisteth in the splendor, grace, and defence thereof: it may bee demanded, how a Prince might beget such a reuerent opinion of himselfe amongst his subiects, & forreigners likewise, whereby he might become both admired and feared?*



Hall he effect this, if he institute such a forme of government, which is <sup>a</sup> seuer, <sup>*a Cicero pro milone.*</sup> constant, and strict, bearing an hard hand ouer those whom he ruleth? Or shall he attaine therunto the better, if hauing <sup>b</sup> hom e-bred strength & forces, he continually <sup>*b Mach. Prin. & Tholo.*</sup>

¶ *Claudian. 3.*

¶ *So Ferdinand King of Spain, and Henry the 5. King of England, grew famous.*

¶ *Mach. Prin. Cap. 21.*

tinually keepe them about him, and haue them in a readinesse? Or if he be destitute of such forces, doe straight wayes take a course to prouide them else-where? Or shall he compass this the rather, if he excell other Princes in the <sup>c</sup> integrity and soundnesse of his manners, fashions, and good conditions? Or shall he yet the better effect this, if hee delight still <sup>d</sup> to be in action, and grow famous for well performing of what hee vndertaketh? Or shall he likewise obtaine his purpose, if in cases of difference betwixt Princes, he <sup>e</sup> cut off all respects of *Neutrality*, and declare himselfe for one of them? Or shall he this way come to his ends, if he giue this testimony to the world, that hee is a louer of vertue, honouring all excellent men, of what sort and Art soeuer? Or finally, shall he this way compass his desires, if hee giue encouragement and hope to his subiects whom hee gouerneth, that they shall liue quietly vnder his protection, and peaceably go about their affaires and businesse, in what kinde soeuer they shall traffique or deale?

2 *It may further be demanded, wherefore it concerneth a Prince so deeply to be highly esteemed both at home and abroad?*

¶ *Fran. Guiccb.*

¶ *Idem.*

**I**S it for that <sup>f</sup> estimation and authority once lost (which may easily be done) can hardly or neuer be recouered againe? Or is it for that <sup>g</sup> estimation and authority in martiall affaires, is of so great



great consequence, that the effecting of any business of import, doth wholly seeme to depend thereupon? Or may it be for this reason rather, that it shall be much more difficult for him whose credit and estimation beginneth to decay to defend himselfe and his estate from the least dangers, then for him who keepeth vp his estimation, and hath it imprinted in the hearts of his subiects or souldiers, to effect great matters, though his meanes be weaker? Or may it be for this reason likewise, for that it sometimes importeth a Prince to set his authority vpon the tentors, and stretch it beyond his ability for the effecting and performing of some great enterprise? Now a Prince shall neuer bring this to passe, vnlesse his subiects and souldiers be perswaded, that his power, authority, and estimation, is greater then (indeed) it is; but if they be thereof once perswaded, he shall haue that done readily, freely, and of their owne accords, which otherwise he should neuer haue had granted, much lesse extorted from them against their wils.

3 *It may further be demanded, how a Prince may compasse it to be feared of his subiects, and withall get himselfe great reputation thereby?*

**S**hall he doe this, if he vse them<sup>h</sup> rigorously, <sup>h</sup> *Fran. Guich.*  
and oftentimes inflict seuerer punishments vpon them? For they will easily be brought to stand in feare of him, whom they know both can and will.

*Guiccardine.*

will correct them, and bring them into order, especially if they perceiue him by his naturall inclination, to be thereunto addicted. Or shall hee finally effect this the rather, if he neuer vse a stronger<sup>i</sup> medicine, then the nature of the disease, or strength of his sicke subiects are able to beare?

*4 It may further bee demanded, how a subiect may gaine himselfe reputation with the common people?*

*k Mach. disp.  
cap. 34.*

SHall he doe this, if he be<sup>k</sup> descended of noble Auncestors, who haue approued themselues braue and excellent men in the carriage of themselves, and managing of great actions? Or shall he do this the rather, if he betake himselfe to a wise and well settled course of life, conuersing with none (as neere as he can) but with excellent men, and such are vertuous? Or shall he yet effect this the better, if in his younger yeares he shall performe any thing, either publickly or priuately, which in it selfe is memorable, and withall is honest? Or shall he attaine thereunto likewise, if being trusted with the<sup>l</sup> managing of publique affaires of his Countrey, he discharge himselfe well thereof, hauing rather an eye that his actions may redound to the good of the common-wealth, then to his owne or other mens priuate, how neere or deere soeuer they may be vnto him, or himselfe to himselfe?

*l Mach. Prin.  
cap. 21.*

*6 It may further be demanded, wherefore the Romans thought*



*thought it necessary, that their Generals of the field managing Armes amongst forraigne Nations, should haue free libertie to dispose of those affaires according to their owne best liking.*

**W**As it for that the<sup>m</sup> Senate did well vnderstand, that if they commanded their Generals should attempt nothing without their directions, aduice and priuities, it would be the next way to make them loose, idle, and lesse circumspect in exercising their charge and office? Or was this rather the reason, for that they were perswaded,<sup>a</sup> that the fortune of the warres were doubtfull, and that sometimes suddaine accidents might fall out, which might very much either aduance and further their designs, or greatly hurt them; which occasions (as they rightly deemed) he onely could take, vnderstand, and make aduantage of, who should bee present when they were offered?

<sup>m</sup> Mach. disp. lib. 2. Cap. 33.

<sup>n</sup> Idem Ibidem.

*6 It may further be demanded, how the Authoritie and estimation of a Prince may bee made famous, if he should carry a strict band ouer his subjects, in ruling and gouerning them?*

**S**hould hee compasse his ends, if hee alone should<sup>o</sup> retaine and keepe all the maine offices and busineses of the crowne in his owne hands, so that all men should be enforced to looke vpon, and vnto him, as of whom onely they were to ex-

<sup>o</sup> Tacit. 2. Annal. Liu. etiam lib. 9.

pect all things which might doe them good? Or shall hee yet compasse his designes, if hee neuer prorogue, or continue any too long in an office, (especially in militarie affaires) least his substitute growing too proud, should work any thing which might turne to his preiudice?

7 *It may further be demanded, why this or that Prince his gouvernement is counted sharpe and seuerer; when the rule of others is thought to bee very gentle and easie.*

*P Mach. disp. lib  
3. cap. 22.*

**M**ay this be the reason, for that <sup>P</sup> some austere man comming to the gouernement, doth wish, and hath (as it were) a longing desire to haue all men like himselfe? Or may this rather be the reason, for that such a man comming to sway the state, is commonly a valiant man, and therefore commanding great and difficult enterprises to be vndertaken by his subiects, vseth sometimes seueritie, whereby those things may be put in execution, according as they were commanded them?

8 *It may further bee demanded, wherefore it should bee needfull that that gouernment should be strict and seuerer, which should beget authoritie and estimation to a Prince?*

**M**ay this bee the reason, for that lenitie (for the most part) causeth contempt, and that  
in



in any corruption of manners it is necessary the  
 a subiect doe stand in awe, or be made to stand  
 in awe of his Prince? Or may this rather bee the  
 cause, for that clemencie and remissnesse opens  
 the maine gappe to offending, when men are  
 perswaded that they shall scape vnpunished?  
 For who will feare him who alwayes keepeth  
 his sword fast locked in the scabbard, or for a lit-  
 tle idlennesse suffereth the edge of his authoritie  
 to be blunted? Or may this rather be the reason, for  
 that the common people are euery way better  
 ordered, being compelled to do their duties, and  
 by keeping them in feare, then if all the clemen-  
 cie, courteous intreatie, and demeanor of the  
 Prince should be afforded them?

<sup>a</sup> Salust. Lepid.

<sup>r</sup> Cicero pro Mi-  
lone.

<sup>r</sup> Sen. de Clem.

<sup>r</sup> Cic. I. in Catil.

9 *It may further be demanded, why the constant kee-  
 ping of one manner and forme of gouernment, must  
 needes much auaille to make a Prince much e-  
 steemed?*

**M**ay this bee the reason, for that (as all  
 innouation in a State is dangerous) the  
 Prince shall be put in fault, and greatly  
 blamed, if vpon changing any thing in the go-  
 uernement, it should not well succeed and prof-  
 per? Or may this rather be the reason, for that ex-  
 perience hath taught vs, that those States and  
 Common-wealths are best gouerned, which affect  
 the least alteration of old customes and manners,  
 though they be not all of the best?

<sup>u</sup> Tholo.

<sup>x</sup> Thucid. lib. 6.

20 It may further be demanded, why a godly and Religious Prince is held in great honour and estimation with the people?

1 Tacit. 2. Annal

Is it for that? *Pietie* and *Godlinesse* even of it selfe is venerable, making Princes to seeme like Gods among their people? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the people are perswaded that the<sup>z</sup> Prince will not attempt or goe about any enterprises, but such wherein he shall bee seconded by the helpe of *Heaven*?

2 *Liuy* in his first book maketh mention, that *Numa Pompilius* conferred mightily with the Nymph *Egeria* &c.

**SECT.**



SECT. I. CHAP. X.

Of Glory and Renowne, the desire thereof profitable to the Common-wealth: Of Power and Greatnesse, and the acquiring thereof. Of Ambition and vnlawfull desire of raigning: Of eminent Citties, and their being free, for the most part, from practises of Treasons, Rebellions, Insurrections, Mutinie, & c.

*It may bee demanded, what might bee the reason, that the vehement desire and thirst after glory and renowne, hath alwaies beene praise-worthy, and held profitable for the Common-wealth, whereas the least desire of raigning, in any great Subiect, hath beene condemned on all hands, and ever thought to bee dangerous and hurtfull to the State?*



It because<sup>a</sup> the hunting after honour and renowne, eleuateth and raiseth a mans thoughts, and exciteth to noble and generous

*a Fran. Guicci.*

*b Idem.*

nerous actions? Whereas contrarywise the ambitious, and boundlesse desire of ruling, prouoketh a man to propound to himselfe dangerous courses, and to runne them though it be to his owne vndoing? Or may it bee for this reason likewise, for that hee which is of an <sup>b</sup> ambitious and turbulent spirit, regardeth neither right or wrong, of Soueraigne or Subiect, but vpon the least conceit to compasse his vnlawfull desires, engageth himselfe in factions, brawles, and quarrels, filling all mens hearts with feare, and disturbing the quiet of the State so farre, that as much as in him lyeth, he will rather hazard the safety of it, then desist from his barbarous enterprise? Whereas hee who is onely desirous of honour and renowne, neither feareth dangers, nor attempteth or alloweth of any lewd courses, whereby hee, or his, might bee branded with the note of infamy, or digrace?

<sup>c</sup> *Liuy lib. 2.*  
Potency is the  
high-way to  
gaine authori-  
ty.

2 *It may further bee demanded, how<sup>c</sup> potency and greatnesse may bee acquired, whereby the authority of a Prince may bee made more illustrious and resplendant?*

<sup>d</sup> *Arist. Rhet. II.*  
*cap. 16. & horat.*  
*Serm. II.*

<sup>e</sup> *Tacit. 15. An-*  
*nal.*

**I**S it to bee purchased with money, to whom<sup>d</sup> all things do stoope? Or is it to bee acquired by Armes rather? for this is an infallible rule, that large Empire and Dominion, is not gotten, kept, or maintained by<sup>e</sup> idlenesse, but by the vse and exercise of Armes, and Millitary Discipline? Or is it



it not gotten by these meanes alone, but by<sup>f</sup> firme counsell, and wary circumspection also? Or may it be attained vnto, by making<sup>g</sup> firme leagues, and sure peace with forraigne Princes? Or to conclude, may it bee gotten by the<sup>h</sup> benefite of fortune, who (most what) doth maruailously fauour and aduance some speciall sorts of men?

<sup>f</sup> Tacit. II. Annal.

<sup>g</sup> Arist. Rhet. ad Alex Cap.

<sup>h</sup> Vltim. Quint. Curt. lib. 8.

3 *It may further bee demanded, what might bee the reason that those men who are ambitious, and haue an itching desire to bee inuested with the gouernment of States, if they once bee euected to some eminent place in the Common-wealth, they are neuer contented, but strine and endeuour to rise higher and higher, and if once they can surprize the State, they wil rather die, then come afterwards to leade a priuate life?*

<sup>i</sup> So it fared with Iohn of Gaunt Duke of Lancaster, and Thomas Woodstocke Duke of Glocester, protectors of Rich. the 2. And with Rich. the 3. protector of Edm. the 5. &c.

<sup>k</sup> Mach. disp. lib. I. Cap. 37.

**C**Omme it thus to passe, for that all<sup>k</sup> men euen by nature, are apt and prone to desire great matters, though they bee not so fitted and accommodated in themselues, to obtaine and keepe them? Now where the desire is more then the ability to get, the minde can neuer be at quiet, or contented with those things which already it doth enioy. Or is it for that<sup>l</sup> Ambition of it selfe blindeth the eyes of men, perswading them that their merites and deserts are greater then (indeed) they bee, and thereupon they affect and attempt strange matters, and run head-strong courses to their owne destructions oftentimes?

<sup>l</sup> Guiccardinus.

Or

Or may this bee the reason, for that hee who once hath had his temples circled with a Crowne, can neuer after brooke a priuate life, because Kings and Kingdomes, are euer to bee thought and beleeued to exceed proportion?

4 *It may further bee demanded, what man may rightly be censured and deemed to be ambitious?*

*Aul. Pol.*

*Tholoz. lib. 22*

**I**Shée so to bee deemed and taken, who vnder pretence of amplyfying and enlarging the dignity Royall, will seeke to dominere ouer others, and rule all things according to his owne lusts? without cause or reason, changing the auncient Officers (though neuer so honest) at his will and pleasure, and suffecting others into their places, whom hee well knoweth to be of his owne faction, and (when time shall serue) will fauour his party? Or may hee likewise be thought ambitious who with great<sup>n</sup> gifts, large promises, and all kind and friendly Offices, seeketh to conciliate and get the fauour and good will of the people, whereby hee may be one step higher to his rising?

5 *It may further bee demanded, why all the Arts, cunning and practises, by which ambitious men study to climbe to the height of greatnesse, are kept so secret, that they hardly or neuer burst out, or come to be knowne, till they haue obtained what they sought for?*

Commeth



**C**ommeth it so to passe, for that<sup>o</sup> men do not  
by and by (and as it were vpon the sodaine)  
but by degrees grow ambitious; whose progresses  
being not obserued (except of some few) they  
may more easily deceiue and blind mens eyes? Or  
may this rather be the reason, for that the ambiti-  
ous do alwaies<sup>p</sup> vse some honest pretext whereby  
they may compasse their designes, as though all  
their actions did tend and bend to these ends,  
least the Common-wealth (forsooth) or them-  
selues should be wronged, when the truth is, that  
they strue to get the garland, that thereby they  
may both oppresse others, and the weale Publick?

<sup>o</sup> Mach. disp. lib.  
prim. Cap. 46.

<sup>p</sup> Idem. Ibidem.

*6 It may further be demanded, how, and by what safe  
meanes it may be provided for, that a man shall  
not grow too ambitious and insolent in a State, or  
if hee should, how his insolency may bee repressed,  
and nipt in the head, whilst it is yet in the bud?*

**M**ay this bee effected, if there should neuer  
way be giuen, or meanes afforded, to cre-  
ate or erect any such office, or eminent dignity in  
the Common-wealth, out of the which the State  
might haue cause to feare, least in proceffe of  
time, Tyranny might take her first rising, and be-  
ginning there-from? Or may it rather thus bee  
compassed, if the State take heed, and with wary  
circumspection prouide, <sup>q</sup> that they neuer foster,  
cherish, or bring vp, any Lyons Whelpes, much  
lesse

<sup>q</sup> Aristophanes  
in Ranis.



lesse the Lyon himselfe, within their Territo ries?  
 Or may it thus likewise be done, if such wormes,  
 and<sup>r</sup> moaths, which breed of too much moisture,  
 and are wont to consume those things whereof  
 they had their beginnings, bee choked or shaken  
 off, before they come to any great bignesse, or  
 turne the whole Substance of that they feed vp-  
 on, into their owne? Or may it thus likewise bee  
 brought to passe, if heed be taken, that if by the  
 heate of the bosome of the Common-wealth,  
 there bee hatched and nourished any dangerous  
 serpent, it bee<sup>t</sup> timously exposed to the cold  
 (which is the onely way to kill it) yet neuer suffer  
 it to hisse other where in a place more commo-  
 dious, least by sucking out the poyson thereof,  
 there might follow a deeper stinging? Or may  
 this also be effected, if heed be taken that the<sup>r</sup> am-  
 bitious bee neuer permitted to ingage himselfe in  
 any publique businesse, especially neuer employ-  
 ed in Martiall affaires, least by the well managing  
 thereof, he draw vnto himselfe credit and estima-  
 tion with the Common-people, which hee abu-  
 sing, might afterwards turne to the hurt and dam-  
 mage of the Weale Publique? Or may it bee  
 brought to passe by this meanes also, if diuers of  
 his<sup>n</sup> owne rapke and quality do bandy with him,  
 and of set purpose oppose his proceedings, the  
 munition, and all other warlike furniture, being  
 (in the meane time) vnder the command of the  
 Prince, or Common-wealth? Or may this finally  
 be effected, if hinderance be giuen to his ambi-  
 tious

<sup>r</sup> Tholoz. lib. 22.

<sup>f</sup> The errour  
of the Atheni-  
ans and Floren-  
tines, that they  
would not doe  
after this  
Counsell.

<sup>t</sup> The practise  
of Rich. the 2.  
against the  
Duke of Here-  
ford, and Tho.  
Mowbray Duke  
of Norfolkke:  
For the King  
feared Heref.  
least (hauing  
the loue of the  
people) hee  
should haue  
vanquisht  
Mowbray, and  
so hee banish-  
ed them both,  
and least also  
it might haue  
fallen out that  
the Duke of  
Heref. should  
haue gotten  
the victory,  
& so haue gra-  
ced himselfe.

<sup>n</sup> Tholoz. lib. 22.

<sup>x</sup> Mach. disc. lib.  
1. cap. 52.



tious designes, by the same waies, meanes, and instruments, which he himselfe vsed to climbe to the top of his desires?

7 *It may lastly be demanded, wherefore the more eminent Cities (as in particular it may truely bee instanced in, and of, this Honourable Citie of London) are generally free from plotting, practising, or contriuing any treasons, rebellions, insurrections, mutinies, &c. against the Prince, or State: when other more remote parts of the Kingdome, are, and euer haue beene more subiect to put in practise such hellish proiects?*

**I**S it for that in the more famous and eminent Cities (where the Magistrates are commonly more carefull and watchfull then other where) the plotters of treasons and rebellions, cannot so conveniently conueene and come to together, to consult about their villanies, without being noted, obserued, and espied, as they may do vnder any colourable pretext, in the Countries neere adioyning, or other remote parts from such Cities? Or is it not for this cause alone, but for that in such eminent Cities (and in particular within this Citie of London) the word of God is more plentifully Preached, whereby the Citizens are better instructed in their duties to God and their Prince, then commonly they are in all the Countre besides? Or may this bee a further reason for the said Citie of London in particular, for that as

So Iacke Straw his rebellion begun in Kent, in the time of Rich. the 2. who was flaine by the Right Honourable William Walworth, in Smith-field, whereby the Citie for that honourable seruice had the Dagger added to their Armes. So Iacke Cade his conspiracy and rebellion in Henry the 6. his daies, came from Kent likewise. So Kets conspiracie came from Norfolk in the time of Edw. the 6. So the rebellion in the North, was moued against Q. Elizabeth of Famous memory by impious Pius Quintus B. of Rome. So the powder-treason was plotted & contriued in our Soueraigne Lord King James his

time, by diuers  
Gentlemen in  
seuerall Coun-  
tries. But in all  
these there was  
neuer a Citi-  
zen in any of  
them.

well the chiefe Magistrate thereof, as other worthy Citizens therein, are neerer to the Court, and by reason of their eminent places, and prime Offices which they beare, and daily do execute for the Prince, and in his name, to the good of Towne and Country, haue (euer) more dependance of their Prince, then in other places further distant there-from, the other subiects can haue: whereby it commeth to passe that they neuer desire innovations, nor engage themselves and their estates by plotting of treasons, raising rebellions, &c. but content themselves with their owne conditions, studying to loue, and to bee beloued of their Prince, which things are not so well performed by particulars, in places further distant there-from, as hath beene shewed: Or, to conclude, may this likewise be the reason, for that the said Citie of *London*, being the *Chamber* of the Prince, wherein hee euer presumeth that hee may be most safe, the Citizens euen out of their loue and loyalty to their Prince, haue euer thought foule scorne that themselves should be found vntrue, or disloyall; or that themselves, or their Citie should be branded with the hatefull name of Traytors, or hauing treason, rebellion, or treachery, hatched in it?



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SECT. I. CHAP. XI.

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Of Studies, dispositions, & whence the diuersitie thereof may proceed: Of Learning likewise, knowledge of tongues and Histories, how necessary & auailable they are in generall, but especially for a Prince, that thereby he may more cleerly see, and exactly iudge of his owne affaires. Of Intelligence, and the vse and benefit thereof.

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*It may be demanded, whence the varieties of studies and diuersity of dispositions of men might proceed?*

**D**Oth this diuersity happen by<sup>a</sup> reason of the varietie of times and places? Or not so neither, but by the mutabilitie of the vnstable multitude rather, of whom this Prouerbe is truly verified, *So many men, so many mindes?* Or falleth it out thus

L 3

<sup>b</sup> Tholozanus.

thus the rather, by reason of the<sup>b</sup> difference of yeares, and vnlikenesse of manners of the inhabitants of one and the selfe-same kingdome, the desires and ends of the Nobles, Senators, and people, being cleane contrary one to the other?

2 *It may further be demanded, wherefore wise men haue in all ages greatly indenuoured to perswade all men to get learning and knowledge before any other thing?*

<sup>c</sup> Sen. Epist. 98.

<sup>d</sup> Quintilian, lib. 12.

**W** As it because they plainly saw and perceiued, that it was the best meanes<sup>c</sup> to purge and purifie the mindes of men, whereby they might bee apted to receiue and retaine vertuous precepts? Or might this be the reason, for that they well knew, that the embracing of good letters was<sup>d</sup> the high-way to wisdom, by which the policie of a State is most aduanced?

3 *It may further be demanded, wherefore the knowledge and skill of languages is necessary and profitable for all men, but especially for a Prince and priuy Councillour?*

<sup>e</sup> Guicch.

<sup>f</sup> Cominatus.

**M** Ay this be the reason, for that all men are commonly well pleased to<sup>e</sup> vnderstand, & to be vnderstood of those with whom they shall chaunce to haue any dealing? Or may this be the cause, for that a man being skilfull in the tongues, can<sup>f</sup> better explaine himselfe and his owne



owne meaning, and shall much better bee vnderstood, then if he should deale by an Interpreter? Or may this likewise be a maine reason, for that many times it falleth out, that a priuy Councillor is to take notice of some serious businesses, which mightily import the State to know, and bee secret in, which things can neuer be related, and transacted so well, nor to such good purpose, if for want of knowledge of the tongues, the Councillor or Relator must of necessity vse the helpe of some third person? Or may the knowledge of tongues bee thought so auailable to a Prince or Statesman, for the entertaining and giuing audience to Embassadors, hearing of their messages, be they hostile or friendly, and giuing them their dispatches, answeres, and dismissions?

4 It may further bee demanded, wherefore wise men haue held the knowledge of Histories to be the readiest way whereby a man may become wise, calling  
 5 History the life and soule of memory, the light of  
 6 truth, director of mans life, &c?

<sup>g</sup> Tacit. 4. Annal.

Cic. de Orator.

Diodorus Siculus.

Cominæus.

<sup>h</sup> Diop. Sicul. 1. Bibliorum.

**I**S it because that by reading of Histories, a man shall truely find<sup>b</sup> Vertue, to haue her due praise, and honour giuen her, as contrariwise to Vice, her due shame and reproofe? Or may this bee the reason, for that<sup>i</sup> History is auailable to instruct any priuate man (of what degree soeuer) how to frame his life, and carry himselfe with commendation in the eye of the world, when, as in a glasse,

<sup>i</sup> Plutarchus. in Timolconte.

he



*<sup>k</sup> Livy lib. i.*

he shall see how to beautifie & compose it, according to the patterne of other mens vertues? Or may this bee a further reason, for that thereby a man may<sup>k</sup> become a Statesman, and know how to manage publique affaires, drawing his rules and directions out of old Antiquities, and times passed, as out of a Store-house, and making application thereof to the time present?

*5 It may further be demanded, what may be the chiefe use, benefit and end of Intelligence?*

*<sup>l</sup> Fran. Guicch. Aut. Pol.*

**M**AY it be beneficiall to a Prince or State, because he may thereby<sup>l</sup> distinctly know the condition and state of all Countries, the power and strength of their Princes and Governors, the wisdom and skilfulnesse of their Senators, in managing the affaires of State, and the originals and continuance of their families, with many other particulars necessary to bee knowne to a Prince or State, who either hath, or may have dealing with other Nations? Or may this rather be the chiefe use & end of Intelligence, that a Prince or wise Statesman may thereby better<sup>m</sup> discover the secret fraudes, and cunning practises of his faire tongued, and smooth-faced friends (but indeed his craftie and subtile adversaries) as likewise the machinations, drifts, and intents of his open enemies, whereby he may better be enabled to explicate and winde himselfe out of dangers, or frustrate their intentions, by crossing and counter-mining of them?

*<sup>m</sup> Polib. lib. i. Pacuvius & Guich.*



SECT. I. CHAP. XII.

Of peace, and the conditions thereof: Of the State, and affaires of Princes: Of Embassages, Embassadours, and who are fittest to vndertake such charge: what Arguments are most perswasive, and of the great vse of Eloquence in a States-man or Embassadour.

*I It may bee demanded, why wise-men haue alwaies thought peace to be expedient for both parties, as well for the victor, as those who haue beene conquered?*



**M**IGHT it bee for this reason, for that they supposed it<sup>a</sup> impossible <sup>a Senec. Herc.</sup> for the world to continue, if it <sup>Fur.</sup> should bee vexed with continuall wars? Or might this rather be the reason, for that they truly iudged that the<sup>b</sup> conquered must of necessity, accept <sup>b Idem Il idem,</sup>



*c. Liu. lib. 30.*

*a Tacit. Annal.  
lib. 12.*

*c. Henr. Ransou.  
de re Bellica.*

cept of what peace and conditions fouer the Victor shall grant them? And that they thought it likewise to bee a<sup>c</sup> comely and gracefull thing to the conquerour, to affoord them peace vpon reasonable termes, that all men might take notice, that hee knew how to begin, and ingage himselfe in a iust warre, and was able likewise to make an end thereof? Or might not this be the onely reason, but for that they thought it<sup>d</sup> profitable likewise, and safe for the Conquerour to lay downe his Armes, considering that if hee should still prosecute the warres, hee should reape nothing but wearisomenesse by continuing and protracting of them, and if hee should make too much hast, and as it were inforce an end of them, hee might runne himselfe into many and<sup>e</sup> needlesse dangers, euen to the hazard of his owne estate, which otherwise hee might easily haue auoyded? For Fortune will sometimes play the Iade, and the euent of warres is vncertaine?

2. *It may further bee demanded, how a safe and firme peace, may bee distinguished and knowne from that which is vn Timer and not to be trusted vnto?*

*f. Liu. lib. 25.*

*g. Tacit. 4. Hist.*

**M**AY this be knowne, if the peace bee<sup>f</sup> honest, as putting an end to the warres, by giuing and accepting of tollerable conditons? Or may it this way be knowne likewise, if it bee<sup>g</sup> simple, plaine, and without false colours or glosses, ambiguity of words, or equiuocations, and not  
subiect



subiect to what constructions the peace-breaker may wrest or draw them?

3 *It may further bee demanded, why that Prince who came to his Kingdome by some of the Nobility, or Senate, shall more hardly keepe it, then another, who obtained the Crowne by the suffrages and assistance of the people?*

**I**S it because that<sup>h</sup> those of the Nobility thinke themselves to be little inferiour, or rather equall with the Prince, whereupon hee cannot sway the Scepter as him listeth, but must bee glad in the most things to be ruled by them? Or may this rather bee the reason, for that it will bee thought the Prince will<sup>i</sup> neuer be able sufficiently to satisfie those Nobles, without the hurt and wronging of others, which when hee cannot, those very men, by whose aide and assistance hee got the Crowne, will bee the first who will pull him downe againe? Or may this be the reason, for that<sup>k</sup> if the Commons should make head against the Prince, hee could neuer bee secured of his safety, or retayning of his Kingdome, because they would oppresse him with multitude, the Nobility being but a handfull to them?

<sup>h</sup> Mach. Prin. cap. 9.

<sup>i</sup> So fared it with the Duke of Buckingham, in the time of Richard the 3. with Charles the 8. and Lewis the 12. Kings of France, in the losse of Milane, &c. as reporteth Mach. Prin. Cap. 9.

<sup>k</sup> Idem Ibidem.



4 *It may further be demanded, wherefore it so much importeth a Prince to manage his Martiall affaires in his owne person, if hee euer looke to grow famous by his conquests?*

*Quint. Curt.  
Mach. Prin.*

*So Alexander  
the Great, Fer-  
dinand King of  
Spaine, and  
Hen. the 5. King  
of Eng. became  
famous.*

*Mach. disput.  
lib. 1. cap. 30.*

**I**S it because it<sup>l</sup> so much encreaseth and augmenteth his estimation, and credit with forraigne Princes abroad, and breedeth and begetteth him loue and authority among his owne people at home? Or may this be the reason, for that by this meanes, all<sup>m</sup> wrangling occasions, and heart-burnings are cut off, whereby a Prince sometimes proueth vngratefull to men, euen of the best deserts? For when Princes are present, and behaue themselves brauely in the field, all the honour and glory thereof (as it pertaineth) so it redoundeth vnto them: whereas otherwise if they were absent, and committed the managing of those affaires to their Generals, they straight waies imagine, that if their forces should preuaile, the glory of the day should rest with the Generall, who led the Army, and that themselves can neuer challenge any part of the victory gotten, vnlesse they extinguish the merites of the Generall, or himselfe, and by that meanes proue vniust and vngratefull to their seruants.



5 *It may further be demanded, how a Courtier may come to bee much imployed in his Princes affaires?*

**M**ay he effect this, if he<sup>n</sup> should waite diligently, and bee alwaies in the eye of the Prince? Or may hee compasse this the rather, if once imployed hee manage that affaire well? For by this meanes, hee shall both gaine himselfe reputation, and bee thought fit and able to deale in any businesse, and be sure (almost) neuer to be out of action, by reason of the dependencie which other businesses haue vpon those, wherein hee formerly hath beene employed. <sup>n</sup> Guicch.

6 *Considering that by well or ill managing and handling of the affaires of Princes, in negotiating for them with forreigne Princes, either great good, or great hurt may accrew to the Prince and State, it may be demanded what manner of men a Prince might chiefly imploy for Embassadors to forreigne Princes?*

**S**hall hee vse such as are<sup>o</sup> skilfull to picke and <sup>o</sup> Comineus. gleane something out of other mens employments, and appropriate it to themselves, if there bee hope that their credit and estimation, may grow greater by it? Or shall not a Prince trust to such to negotiate for him, but to those rather, who are faithfull, carefull, meeke, and gentle, and



haue beene long practised and experienced in managing such affaires?

7 *It may further be demanded, with what tooles an Ambassadour shall soonest perswade a forreigne Prince, and draw him to fauour, and further his maisters designs?*

*p Tholo.*

*a Fran. Guicch.  
Cominaus.  
Mach. Prin.*

**S**Hall he assaile him with<sup>p</sup> firme arguments and sound reasons? But hee that is nice, and hath a speciall opinion of his owne wisedome, will presently distast that or any thing that is solide. Or shall he rather set vpon him with<sup>a</sup> representations of colours, Popularities, and circumstances? And (to speake as the truth is) these are of no lesse (if they bee not of more) force, then firme and sound reasons: For circumstances, colours, representations, and such like stuffe, are of such power and efficacy, that they can giue life to true and sound reasons, peruert the iudgement, if it bee not stable and well grounded, and quickly leade into errour.

8 *It may further bee demanded, why eloquence is so necessary for a Councillour, or an Embassador?*

**I**S it because that daily amost it falleth out, that a Prince hath occasion to send some one or other



other of his Councell to forreigne States, either to perswade; to accuse, or defend; to gratulate, or condole, &c. Now it is both requisite, and necessary, and commodious for a Prince to be furnished with men so qualified, with eloquence, utterance, &c. as that they may with credit to him and his Court, well discharge the place, and person they sustaine; And it should be a great shame, disadvantageous, and dishonourable to the Prince, if for want of such gifts, in any whom hee should send on such errands; it should fall out otherwise. Or may it rather be for this cause; for that in<sup>r</sup> pacifying such as are seditious in the State, and compounding the quarrels and differences of such as are factious, there is no better meane to accord them, then to vse an eloquent and plausible speech.

unto them?

*Quintilian*

**SECT.**

## SECT. I. CHAP. XIII.

Of Discord and Faction, whereof they take their beginnings, and of the nourishing, or not nourishing of them in a Commonwealth.

I *It may bee demanded from whence discords and factions haue their beginnings?*

<sup>a</sup> Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 22.



Or they arise of such <sup>a</sup> motions as are sodainely suggested to the people, so that there cannot bee time giuen them to thinke or consider what matter they go about? Or do they take their beginnings rather of <sup>b</sup> the priuate or open hatred of Familiars? Or may they proceed rather from the roote of <sup>c</sup> pride and ambition, whilst euery man striueth to proceed, and go before

<sup>b</sup> Idem Ibidem.

<sup>c</sup> Senec. Epist.  
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before another, and is alwaies detracting from him hee liketh not? Or may they haue their beginnings from idlenesse and loosenesse of liuing, which oftentimes are wont to minister occasions of ciuill (or rather vnciuill) brawles and contentions? Or may they arise of the<sup>d</sup> different mindes and dispositions of the people, from the designs and intentions of the Nobility? Or not so much from thence neither, but of the waue-ring mutability of the vnconstant multitude also? their yeares being so diuers, and their manners so vnlike: For it is impossible, that where there is such and so great diuersity of yeares, and disparity of manners, that the multitude or Commons altogether, should equally well like of, affect, and comport the present State, but contrarywise disagree, grow factious, and contentious.

*d Tholoꝝ. de Re  
pub. lib. 22.*

*2 It may further bee demanded, whether it may  
bee beneficiall to a Prince or State to nourish  
factions, or no?*

**I**T were too hard a taske for mee (*Right Honourable*) to take vpon mee definitiuely to determine this question: for I am not ignorant that amongst diuers men, and those of the wisest sort, this doubt hath beene canuased, and greatly controuerted; yet seeing that I am entred into it, I thought it not fit altogether to passe it ouer in silence,



*Mach. Prin.*  
*cap. 20.*

lence, without shewing your *Honour* my priuate opinion therein, which that I may do the better, I will rip vp the Arguments on both sides. That factions (therefore) should bee nourished of a Prince or State, many things may induce and perswade thereunto, but especially these two, *Honour* and *Profit*. For that *Prince*<sup>e</sup> must needes bee honoured and feared, who alwaies hath an enemy at his owne deuotion, and neuer resisting his designs and enterprises: For hee that can conquer when hee list, is not onely admired, but much feared likewise, both at home and abroad. For all men with one voyce will giue it out, that hee got the victory by his owne valour and prowesse: Which so reported and beleued, there is no doubt but that hee shall bee much renowned therefore, though he atchieued it otherwise; namely, by being seconded with a potent faction, ioyning with him against their owne Prince, or otherwise. Againe, that the chiefeft and most potent Cities of a Kingdome, should be brought vnder the Princes subiection, it were not onely condu cible and necessary, but also profitable, both to him and the common-wealth. Now to effect this, a Prince must either vse force or policy. If hee say to compasse his designs by force, hee must of necessity offer many iniuries to the people, which the more openly they are done, the more they do prouoke them to mislike the Prince: For that which the Law hath made Mine, and Thine, if it should be snatched away from



from the Subject, it would bee grievously taken, and held for no better then an intollerable peece of iniustice. But when the<sup>f</sup> Cities of themselves are become factious, and the Citizens doe waste and consume themselves by quarrels and factions, the fault shall neuer bee laid on the Prince, but on the factious, and yet by this meanes the Prince in effect, shall obtaine what hee desired. For the Cities hereby growing weake, and wearied with continuall garboiles, will willingly put themselves into the Princes protection, and yeeld themselves subiect to his will. Further, for a Prince to diuert the current of the warres, or any hostile inuasions, from his owne doores, it is very necessary, behouefull and conuenient: Now it is not incredible, that euer hee shall haue any better way, or meane to bring this to passe, then by<sup>s</sup> nourishing factions, and dissentions in his enemies Countrie; for many haue put this in practise heretofore, and greatly thriuen thereby: Moreouer diuers of the wisest sort, haue thought it very aduantageous to the Prince, that the<sup>h</sup> Subjects should neuer come altogether, to consult, or agree altogether, vpon any thing which might tend to their common or particular safeties. To conclude,<sup>i</sup> that a great Prince, or Monarch, may become more wary of his enemy, and better conserue his owne estate, it hath beene thought fit, by some of the wisest heads that euer haue beene, that such a Prince should neuer bee without an enemy, or be a great nourisher of facti-

<sup>f</sup> Mach. dis. lib. 2. cap. 25.

<sup>s</sup> Herod. lib. 4. Xenoph. de Pedia Cyri. lib. 3.

<sup>h</sup> Tacit. Agric.

<sup>i</sup> Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 23.



<sup>k</sup> Mach. lib. 3.  
dis. cap. 37.

<sup>l</sup> Idem Ibidem.

<sup>m</sup> Idem Prin.  
cap. 20.

ons in a forreigne Land: Which course, if *Rome* had taken, and not destroyed *Carthage*, they should haue had their braue spirited youth better trayned vp, practised, and made ready in feates of Armes, which might haue steeded the Common-wealth for offence or defence thereof; Graue and mature counsell should haue flourished in the Senate, the Citizens should not haue wasted themselves with ciuill warres, and so the Empire should haue beene more durable and lasting. Thereasons of those who hold it vnprofitable, and euery way disaduantageous to a Prince, to nourish factions, are as follow. It is <sup>k</sup> impossible, say they, by reason of an inbred inconstancy in the nature of men, that those factions, which at this, or that present, depend vpon a Prince, should alwaies, and after one and the selfe-same manner, bee so affected towards him, for that men being wauering, doe greatly desire sometimes this Prince, sometimes that Prince, to be their chiefe Patron. Againe, <sup>l</sup> the nourishing of factions, by a Prince in a forreigne Land, is oftentimes the cause, that by little and little, discords and ciuill garboyles are brought into his owne Country, which will scarcely be thought to bee conuenient. Further, a great inconuenience, or rather an apparant losse might happen to a Prince, who should nourish factions within his owne Dominions; For <sup>m</sup> vpon any sodaine inuasion, such Cities of his, which should happen to bee rent asunder by factions, must of necessity be



be all lost : For the<sup>n</sup> weaker part would rather submit, and apply it selfe to a stranger, then yeeld to the aduers<sup>e</sup> faction in any thing. Moreover this course of governing, by nourishing of factions, must needs<sup>o</sup> argue the weakenesse, and imbecility of the Prince, both in power and iudgement : For if hee were strong and prudent, hee would neuer indure that his Country should bee torne in peeces by factions and contentions. To conclude, seeing that euery faction consisteth of few or many, both of these must needs bee hurtfull to the Common-wealth : This latter for that<sup>p</sup> they trusting to their owne strength, would presently take Armes, and turne the quiet of the State into garboiles : The former likewise, though perhaps somewhat more secretly and slowly, would no lesse vex<sup>e</sup> and molest the Common-wealth, by reason that<sup>q</sup> factions of the Nobility are wont to draw vnto themselues all, or the greatest part of the Commons, to take part with such or such of them, as they most affect. These things thus standing, they conclude, that factions are rather to bee extinguished and quenched, then nourished. For mine owne part (*Right Honourable*) though I will determine nothing of this matter, yet thus I thinke thereof. That Factions, to the singular benefite of the Prince, and Common-wealth, may be nourished in a forreigne gouernment : and though it were not so conuenient (perhaps) they should bee set on foote, and maintained at home, yet at no hand are they to

<sup>n</sup> Tholoz. lib. de Re pub. 23.

<sup>o</sup> Mach. Prin. cap. 20.

<sup>p</sup> Liu. lib. 34.

<sup>q</sup> Arist. 5. Polit. cap. 4.



be neglected, especially in the time of peace. For seeing that there is no Common-wealth, which doth not breed and bring forth, yea foster and cherish some enuy and contention: these contentions may proue healthfull to the State of a Common-wealth, as Agues are sometime beneficiall to the state of a mans body: And it is certaine that the *Romane* Common-wealth, was neuer in better health and safety, then when the *Tribunes* of the People, and the *Patricians* were at variance: and the *Lacedemonian* State neuer in better state, then when their *Ephori*, and their Kings could not agree. For by this curbing of one another, the publique Offices of a Common-wealth were better discharged, both at home and abroad.

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SECT.



SECT. I. CHAP. XIII.

Of Sedition, Mutiny, and defection, of the greatest part of the people in a State, and of standing *Newtrall*, or parttaking.

† *It may be demanded whence sedition and mutiny, in, or, against a State taketh his beginning?*



AY it arise and spring out of the bitter<sup>a</sup> roote of oppression, as when men apprehending the remedy of present evils and dangers, to bee the evils and dangers themselves, doe vpon a sodaine breake out, and so

<sup>a</sup> *Tholoz. Aristotle 5. Pol. Cap. 3.*

take Armes? Or may it proceede<sup>b</sup> of feare as the Phylosopher well conceited? For feare may moue and incite men, to bee seditious, fearing or expecting punishments to be inflicted vpon them, for the wrongs they haue done, and by this meanes

<sup>b</sup> *Idem Ibidem.*



meanes running out, they thinke (or at least are willing) to preuent them before they can bee put in execution. Or may this proceed of too much indulgency, clemency, and remissnesse of the gouernement, together with the superfluity and aboundance of all things, it being rather the nature of the people to<sup>c</sup> grow to bee Wantons then Warriours? Or may it come rather of<sup>d</sup> penury, and scarcity of things necessary? Or may it happen through the<sup>e</sup> pride and ambition of euill Gouvernours and Councillours? Or may it rather arise of taking vp too much mony at Vse, with the which the Commons being (as it were) eaten vp, and their states consumed, they grow desperate thereupon, and so take Armes, thinking themselves most safe when they runne the most vncertaine courses? for worse then they are, they thinke they cannot bee.

<sup>c</sup> *Livy lib. 2.*

<sup>d</sup> *Salust. Sugurib.*

<sup>e</sup> *Livy lib. 38.*

<sup>f</sup> *Tacit. 1. Hist.*

2 *It may further bee demanded, whether, when once sedition groweth hot, and commeth to Heads, it were better to stand Newtrall, then to fall to part-taking?*

<sup>g</sup> *Solon.*

<sup>h</sup> *Sic refert A. Gallius, in Noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12.*

**T**ouching this Question (*Right Honourable*) vnlesse that<sup>g</sup> great *Athenian Law-giuer*, had decreed and established by Law, that vpon any sedition arising in that State, <sup>h</sup> he that would not take part with one side, should bee banished the Citie, and loose all that euer hee possessed; I should scarce haue thought it worth the looking into:



into: but after so wise a man had determined it, and for that I perceiued others, who thought themselves as wise, as the said *Law giuer*, did stiffely stand against his opinion, and vpon good grounds (as they suppose) produced arguments to the contrary, I thought it worthy my labour likewise, to put downe the reasons on both sides, and in conclusion to enterpone mine own priuate opinion touching the premisses. Those therefore who stand on *Solons* side, and allow and stand for part-taking doe thus argue: <sup>i</sup> If the good men, <sup>1 A. Gallus</sup> which be in the Citie or Common-wealth, per- <sup>noct. Attic. lib. 2.</sup> ceiuing the *Seditious* to bee madded with fury, <sup>cap. 12.</sup> and to grow to an head, should apply themselves to either part, there is no doubt, but that they might bee a meanes to reduce them to vnity; perswading first with their owne side, how ill besee- ming a thing it is, for Citizen to striue with, or take Armes against Citizen, and what destructi- on of them and theirs may ensue, if they suffer themselves still to be led with passion, and by that meanes mollifying their owne friends minds, they may (happily) get leaue likewise to deale with the other side, in those or such like termes, and so perswade both parties to lay downe their wea- pons. Againe, <sup>k Phanorinus</sup> those which take part with nei- <sup>Philosophus.</sup> ther side, if the differences of the factious should once bee compounded, should smart for it, being hated on both sides, deemed as pub- lique enemies, and such as solaced themselves, and reioyced to see them at those oddes, and  
O therefore



<sup>1</sup> *Iosephus de bello Iudaico.*

*Tacit. Annal.*

*Salust. in bello Jugurthino.*

therefore are iustly exposed to the prey, and iniuries of either party. Further, it were very dangerous when the Citie or Common-wealth is diuided into faction, not to take part with the one or the other side, least a<sup>1</sup> third faction should spring out of the others, as hath sometimes beene read to haue falne out in the Iewes Common-wealth. But those which stand for newtrality, think otherwise, and thus they reason<sup>m</sup> Ciuill Armes of themselves, can neither be prouided, taken vp, or managed by any good or lawfull meanes, and the issue and end of them commonly proueth naught. For the Leaders and Captaines of the seditious, vnder the pretence of seeking the good of the Common-wealth, do euery one seeke to promote his owne ambitious humours, and so draw the people to follow their fancies, which no good Patriote ought to do. Againe, it argueth great folly in any, who shal take either part, and ioyne with the seditious: for by that meanes they<sup>n</sup> strengthen and encourage them, encrease their malice towards their Countrey-men, and fellow-Citizens of the aduerse partie, and become partakers of their rebellions, madnesse, and folly. Touching mine owne priuate opinion herein, I think (right Honourable) that newtrality is regularly to be auoyded in either Prince or Courtier, except in some maine case, where a man by making shew to be newtrall, may more handsomly compouud and contriue his owne businesse, and better promote, and sooner come to his owne ends.

*FINIS.*



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